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ABSTRACT
A prime focus of police-reform advocates is the transparency of
police discipline. Indeed, transparency is one of, the most popular
accountability solutions for a wide swath of policing problems. This
Article examines the “transparency cure” as it applies to Police
Disciplinary Records (“PDRs”). These records are part of an officer’s
personnel file and contain reported wrongdoing from supervisors,
Internal Affairs Bureaus, and Citizen Complaint Review Boards.
This Article argues that making PDRs public is worthy of skeptical
examination. It problematizes the notion that transparency is a worthy
end goal for those who desire to see police-reform in general.
Transparency is often seen as a solution with no downside, but this
Article argues that, in the realm of PDRs, it comes with at least two
major tradeoffs. First, making PDRs public will may lead to the
accountability that advocates seek, and in fact may cause retrenchment
from police departments. Second, transparency on an individual level
necessarily comes with major privacy tradeoffs.
The problem with individualized transparency is not theoretical. In
fact, it has been much critiqued by scholars in a different but
comparable realm: the wide dissemination of criminal records. PDRs
and criminal records have similar problems: due process issues,
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inaccuracy, arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and permanent
reputational harm. Indeed, the rhetoric used by law enforcement to
defend their privacy rights sounds almost identical to the critiques that
scholars make of criminal record transparency.
This Article argues that the comparison of PDRs and criminal
records is instructive because it allows us to view criminal records
through a new lens. As with criminal record publication, forced PDR
transparency will likely not solve the problems advocates hope it will.
Thus, this Article concludes that a more nuanced regime should be put
in place for PDRs, and that advocates should use law enforcement
rhetoric to support a more privacy-protective regime for criminal
records.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 22, 2017, Donald Trump roused a crowd in
Alabama by calling for the firing of football players who knelt during
the national anthem in protest of police brutality: “Wouldn’t you love
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to see one of these NFL owners, when somebody disrespects our
flag . . . say . . . Get that son of a bitch off the field right now, out. He’s
fired. He’s fired!”1 Two days later, a woman posted a photo of herself
kneeling with two black Chicago police officers to her Instagram
account. Her caption said, “That Moment when you walk into the
police station and ask the Men of Color are they Against Police
Brutality and Racism & they say Yes... then you ask them if they
support Colin Kaepernick... and they also say yes... then you ask them
to Kneel.![sic]”2

The Chicago Police Department acted quickly, not to condemn
police brutality, but to assure the public that these two officers would
be disciplined for making “political statements while in uniform . . . .”3
These disciplinary charges will appear without context on the officers’
disciplinary records.
Meanwhile, in 2016, a Philadelphia police officer made news for
his tattoo, visible when he wears his short-sleeve uniform, that depicts

1. Adam Serwer, Trump’s War of Words with Black Athletes, ATLANTIC (Sept. 23, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/09/trump-urges-nfl-owners-to-fire-playerswho-protest/540897 [https://perma.cc/9EEJ-QM42].
2. Aleta Clark (@englewoodbarbie), INSTAGRAM (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.instagram.
com/p/BZbxm-rnNv0 [https://perma.cc/6TCR-LY3X]. The photo above is also from this source.
3. Katherine Rosenberg-Douglas & John Byrne, Emanuel Declines to Criticize Police
Officers Facing Reprimand for Kneeling, CHI. TRIBUNE (Sept. 27, 2017, 6:25 AM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-officers-reprimanded-instagram-takingthe-knee-20170925-story.html [https://perma.cc/GB3R-E6UQ].
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an eagle known as the “emblem adopted by the Nazi party,” though
without the trademark swastika between the bird’s talons. Just above
the wings, he inked the word “Fatherland.”4 The Philadelphia Police
Department opened an investigation in the wake of public uproar but
cleared the officer of any charges, stating that “he didn’t commit any
violations,” and that “[o]fficers . . . have First Amendment protections
like anyone else.”5 This officer’s disciplinary record is thus free of any
mention of his permanent and highly visible political statement
glorifying Nazi Germany.

These two anecdotes reflect the state of internal discipline in
police departments across the country: uneven, arbitrary, and entirely
discretionary.
The issues presented by police discipline have impact far beyond
the individual officers who are subject to such discipline. Indeed,
questions about how police are disciplined, and what the public knows
about their police disciplinary records (“PDRs”), are revealing
themselves as central to issues surrounding policing and, as this paper
will argue, to the longstanding critique of criminal records. PDRs are
taking center stage in police-accountability debates in states like New
York and California where police enjoy a strong privacy right in such

4. Albert Samaha, A Cop with a Tattoo He Swears Isn’t a “Nazi Tattoo” Says A Lot About
Police Free Speech, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.buzzfeed.com/albertsamaha/
they-cant-fire-you-for-whats-in-your-head?utm_term=.yoK6yK9l#.rmZN3JjG [https://perma.cc/
H5UQ-ZLUP]. The photos above are also from this source.
5. Id.
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records.6 Until recently, the privacy of PDRs in these states was
relatively uncontroversial, despite the fact that many other states
already make PDRs public.7 Now, police-reform advocates have begun
to call for disclosure of police records.8 Police officers and their unions,
who have fought hard for privacy and won it in the form of state
statutes and collective bargaining agreements, oppose such calls.9
As can be said for many arguments surrounding policing, this
debate pits central legal and theoretical principles against one another.
On the one hand is the importance of accountability to ensuring a
working democratic system. The police should be accountable to the
public they serve, and many believe that there cannot be accountability
without transparency.10 On the other hand is the profound and evergrowing issue of privacy and control over one’s personal and
professional information in a world where we are increasingly
surveilled, exposed, and outed by government, social media, and
corporate data-collecting entities.11
And yet, transparency and privacy in policing are not described in
these terms. Although very few scholars have written about PDR
publication,12 many have written about policing problems and
proposed solutions. Surveying the literature and policymaking on
6. See Radley Balko, Opinion, New York, California bills look to hold police, prosecutors
more accountable, WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/opinions/wp/2018/08/17/new-york-california-bills-look-to-hold-police-prosecutors-moreaccountable/?utm_term=.82dd9baf9bc0 [https://perma.cc/W6UC-JEZP].
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See Cynthia H. Conti-Cook, Defending the Public: Police Accountability in the
Courtroom, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1063, 1085 (2016) (arguing in favor of more transparency for
PDRs both in and out of the courtroom); Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J.
1191, 1202–03 (2017) (arguing that lack of transparency about police misconduct is a major
obstacle to reform).
9. See infra Part III.A.
10. See generally STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012)
(arguing generally that the criminal justice system should be more transparent).
11. Cf. Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159, 161 (2015)
(arguing that there are constitutional limitations on the ability of the government to out or
disclose intimate information). See generally BERNARD E. HARCOURT, EXPOSED: DESIRE AND
DISOBEDIENCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2015) (discussing the ways in which modern behavior
exposes us to surveillance).
12. The few who have written in depth about PDRs come down firmly on the side of making
these records available to the public. See Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: Impeachment
Evidence in Police Personnel Files and the Battle Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV.
743, 776 (2015) [hereinafter Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot]; Katherine J. Bies, Let the Sunshine In:
Illuminating the Powerful Role Police Unions Play in Shielding Officer Misconduct, 28 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 109, 141–42 (2017); Conti-Cook, supra note 8, at 1085; Rachel Moran, Ending the
Internal Affairs Farce, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 837, 843–44 (2016).
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policing, one would not be remiss in believing that transparency is a
golden ticket to police reform. In fact, transparency has become one of
the most often called-for police-reform suggestions from scholars,
politicians, and even police chiefs.13 Scholars posit that transparency is
a partial or total cure for community-engagement issues, legitimacy,
racial disparities in arrests, the use of more invasive technology, false
confessions, problematic plea bargains, and much more.14 Moreover,
politicians and police departments have embraced what this Article
will call the “transparency cure” with open arms.15
One reason for transparency’s popularity in police reform is that
it is rarely viewed as having any downsides.16 Scholars see little need to
defend their transparency suggestions, beyond remarking that visibility
is not necessarily a solution by itself.17 Policy suggestions to increase
transparency seem to need little evidence to back up the
transformative power of greater police visibility,18 and moretransparent police departments have received tremendous public
relations boosts without needing to show a causal connection between
transparency and actual reform.19 In the world of police reform,
transparency, it would seem, is all sunlight and no shadow.
Yet that perspective shifts for many if we focus the transparency
narrative on a different group of individuals: those accused and
convicted of crime. Indeed, criminal record transparency has long been
a policy with many critics.20 This Article aims to show how similar the
debate over PDRs is to the rationales for and against criminal record
publication. The police defend their privacy using similar rhetoric to
critiques of criminal record publication.21 And advocates of PDR
transparency may undermine larger criminal justice reform by using

13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part I.
15. See infra Part I.
16. See infra Part I.
17. See infra Part I.
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part I.
20. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of
Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1791 (2012) (noting the collateral consequences facing
the “tens of millions” with criminal records); Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104
GEO. L.J. 1197, 1198 (2016) (noting that “the consequences of having a criminal record can far
outstrip any penalty imposed by criminal law”); Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment Law, 39
CARDOZO L. REV. 2265 (2018) (highlighting the employment consequences of having a criminal
record).
21. See infra Part III.A.
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the same public-safety and anecdotal rationales employed to promote
criminal record transparency in order to bolster their arguments
regarding PDRs. Like many solutions to police brutality, little thought
appears to be given to the larger systemic context and the
consequences of removing procedural privacy protections from
individual police officers, either for officers themselves or for the
criminal justice system more generally.22
While transparency may well play a role in some solutions to
policing issues, it is not the panacea—the transparency cure—its
advocates claim it to be.23 And while deidentified information may
come with few downsides, the same cannot be said for publicizing the
information of individuals. Indeed, individualized transparency comes
with at least two major tradeoffs. First, without thinking through the
instrumental goals of transparency, there is no reason to believe that
visibility alone will solve complex, institutional, and organizational
problems that have plagued police departments for decades.24 Second,
transparency, at least at the level of individuals, comes with clear and
significant privacy tradeoffs.25
This Article aims to complicate the transparency-cure narrative so
popular in police-reform circles. It brings a more nuanced perspective
to the table, arguing that we should place the harms of surveillance and
exposure side by side with the benefits resulting from public disclosure
of findings of police misconduct. Doing so results in a more
sophisticated understanding not only of PDRs, but also, and
significantly, of the dissemination of criminal records and records of
wrongdoing more broadly.
PDR publication is, at the very least, worthy of skeptical
examination.26 The downside to this kind of transparency has simply

22. I have made this point in two other articles, arguing that calls to remove procedural
protections from police in the pre-charge stage of the criminal process continue to legitimize an
overall flawed vision of the criminal justice system, one that hurts ordinary defendants. See Kate
Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745, 750 (2016); Kate Levine, Police Suspects,
116 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1201–02 (2016).
23. See David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 102–03 (2018)
(“Progressives . . . have unwittingly enabled [a problematic shift in the use of transparency for
private and corporate ends] by embracing a vision of transparency as a universal tenet of ‘good
governance,’ even a primary virtue worth attaining for its own sake.” (citations omitted)).
24. See infra Part II.C.
25. See infra Parts I, II.C, III.B.
26. See Kate Levine, We Need to Talk About Police Disciplinary Records, FORDHAM URB.
L.J. ONLINE 2 (Aug. 2017), http://urbanlawjournal.com/files/2017/08/WeNeedtoTalkAboutPolice
DisciplinaryRecords_KateLevine-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4LL-QKHS] [hereinafter Levine, We
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not been accounted for beyond reflexive arguments by law
enforcement advocates and unions.27 Yet, without a more thoughtful
publication regime, there is little reason to think that public knowledge
about individual officer misconduct will do much for citizens exposed
to police violence. There is also good reason to believe that if police
know that disciplinary actions will become public, that knowledge
would add perverse incentives to the already-problematic internal
disciplinary regime within many current departments. For example,
senior officers may be less likely to report truly problematic behavior,
and officers may be even more likely to close ranks behind fellow
officers that are accused by citizens of misconduct.28
Transparency’s overemphasis within the police-reform discussion
is only one way in which an inquiry into PDRs is instructive. Another
major unaccounted for reason to closely analyze, and perhaps retain
some skepticism about, the release of PDRs is the downstream
implications for individuals with criminal convictions, whose lives are
constantly affected by the specter of public outing.29 Whether, how, and
for how long to publicize the criminal records of those who have served
their sentences and are attempting to reintegrate into society are
questions that are the subject of much current scholarship and legal
policy.30 These are questions that should be considered again,
particularly as we debate the privacy owed to police who commit
misconduct.
In past articles, I have argued that, for numerous reasons, the
revealed preferences of the police—through laws, collective bargaining
agreements, and norms—have much to tell us about how the law
Need to Talk] (arguing that “the release of police disciplinary records requires balancing privacy
and transparency values”).
27. See infra Part III.A.
28. Indeed California police departments are destroying records after a new transparency
law was passed earlier this year. See Liam Dillon & Maya Lau, California Police Unions Are
Preparing to Battle New Transparency Law in the Courtroom, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2018),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-police-records-law-challenges-20190109story.html?outputType=amp&__twitter_impression=true&fbclid=IwAR0U3A97f8JkLeIle3SIpf
4jb-bdUNK9TJdX3vT2L3d8Uhu9uogA7KB4Dwc [https://perma.cc/4DRN-GM96]. Cf. Levine,
We Need to Talk, supra note 26, at 7 (“Police departments are already notoriously hesitant to fire
bad officers, and will be even less likely to do so if incentives exist for an officer’s misconduct to
go unrecognized.” (citations omitted)).
29. Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information
Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 485, 505 (2013) (“There is no single NGO or interest group dedicated exclusively to
protecting the privacy of the policed poor.”).
30. See supra text accompanying note 20.
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operates for ordinary suspects and defendants. And I have argued that
calls for increased harshness toward police are misguided, especially
when such calls come from those who would like to see the criminal
justice system reformed for ordinary suspects.31 Indeed, the focus
should be on highlighting how the two-tiered system of justice—one
track for police, and one for ordinary suspects—reflects the harshness
of our system toward the many, rather than a problematic leniency
toward a manifestly favored few.32 Here, I take the same theoretical
stance as in my previous works, and focus it on another area of law—
the permanent, public stain of a record of wrongdoing. While at first
blush, the connection between disciplinary records and arrest records
is attenuated, this Article makes the case that the arguments in favor
of record publication for both groups are very similar, as are the
arguments against their publication.33
Advocates for public disciplinary records use reasoning very
similar to those who defend public criminal records. They point to
public safety, the punishment of “bad” people, and the deterrent effect
of potential public shaming as reasons to override police privacy.34
Meanwhile, the police, when they defend their privacy, make many of
the same points that scholars have been making for years on behalf of
the formerly incarcerated who must go through life with the permanent
stain of a criminal record.35 These arguments include the problem of
inaccurate records, the arbitrariness of criminal or disciplinary
enforcement, the outsized reputational harm that comes from a
permanent and public record, and the institutional incompetence of the
public to make rational choices based on the information contained in
a criminal or disciplinary record.36 There are other dynamics not
mentioned by advocates for or against publicizing disciplinary records
that may be even more troubling. These include the threat that

31. See supra text accompanying note 22.
32. See generally Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, supra note 22 (showing that the way
prosecutors and grand juries carefully consider charging decisions when police freedom is on the
line is a model for how such decisions should be made for each and every criminal suspect);
Levine, Police Suspects, supra note 22 (showing that the way police protect themselves during
interrogations mirrors and highlights the way defense advocates have argued that ordinary
suspects should be treated, both to preserve the legitimacy of the process, and, perhaps more
importantly, to ensure that vulnerable suspects do not give false confessions).
33. See infra Part III.
34. See infra Part III.A.
35. See infra Part III.A.1.
36. See infra Part III.A.
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misconduct might be enforced along racial lines,37 and the fact that
officers are disfavored within departments for reasons other than the
misconduct that actually affects the public.38 Such problems add both
to the credence that should be given to those who desire more privacy
for ex-criminal offenders and to the skepticism with which we should
treat calls to publicize disciplinary records. Although there are
arguments that may suggest that some police misconduct should be
made public,39 this Article concludes that, for many reasons, before
making any large-scale reform effort, we must first develop a more
nuanced understanding of what such publication entails.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I develops the theory that
transparency has become a simplistic and underexamined cure for a
wide swath of policing problems. It looks at recent scholarship,
national policy, and individual police department reform to show how
prevalent the notion of transparency has become in police-reform
circles. Part I then problematizes this transparency cure by noting the
autonomy and privacy tradeoffs that accompany transparency. While
privacy scholars have grappled with these issues for decades, these
issues are rarely considered in police-reform conversations.40
Part II then turns to the specific transparency-privacy question at
issue here—the publication of PDRs. It describes what PDRs contain,
the internal disciplinary processes police undergo, and the current state
of privacy for PDRs throughout the United States. It also addresses
some reasons, heretofore unexplored by scholars, why police officers
might consider privacy among the most important job-related
protections they can achieve. Part II then argues that, as suggested in
Part I, forced transparency on the part of individual officers may not
achieve the reforms that police-accountability advocates seek. In fact,
forced transparency may lead to further retrenchment on the part of
police departments—through refusing to record or discipline officers—
further shrouding disciplinary processes, and ignoring the very real
possibility that it is not the most problematic but rather the most
vulnerable officers who are disciplined.

37. See infra Parts II.C, III.B.
38. See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Rights and Regulation: The Evolution of Sexual Regulation, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 573, 586–89 (2016) (describing several cases where officers were disciplined for,
among other things, nonmarital sex and intra-office dating between officers of different ranks).
39. See Levine, We Need to Talk, supra note 26, at 1.
40. See infra Part I.
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Parts III and IV then address the very real concerns that animate
arguments by police in favor of their privacy. It shows that these
concerns—including false allegations, due process, inaccuracy, the
public’s inability to understand these records, and permanent
reputational harm—mirror the arguments that scholars and advocates
have made on behalf of the formerly incarcerated, who currently suffer
under a regime of high visibility of their criminal records. These two
debates mirror and amplify one another: if we are serious about
protecting those with convictions from a permanent stigma of a
criminal record, we should also take police concerns about their
individual privacy seriously. Conversely, those who advocate for police
privacy must also recognize the similarities in the arguments they make
when it comes to the privacy of criminal defendants. Put simply, such
arguments are two sides of the same coin.
Finally, Part V moves toward an appropriate balance for
transparency and privacy for PDRs. It suggests that while PDRs should
be made more available to litigants in criminal and civil cases, serious
thought should be given to the types of information made generally
available to the public.
Calls for more transparency from police and or more prosecutions
against individual officers are similar to calls for more criminal law or
harsher sentencing to resolve a perceived problem with criminality.41
These are often the most easily accessible and appealing solutions, but
they rarely solve the problems they aim to rectify. In a time when
policing problems continue to roil our nation, we must recognize how
systemic, institutional, and baked into the fabric of our grossly bloated
criminal justice system these problems are. Transparency may be part
of the solution, but it comes with serious tradeoffs that must be
acknowledged, discussed, and weighed.
I. PROBLEMATIZING THE TRANSPARENCY CURE
Transparency is among the most prevalent buzzwords in the
conversation on reforming problematic police culture. Almost every
41. A particularly salient example is the national outrage in response to the light sentencing
of Brock Turner, the “Stanford Rapist,” including calls for both a harsher sentence and the recall
of the sentencing judge—the latter of which was ultimately successful. See, e.g., Katie Reilly,
Brock Turner Prosecutor Calls for Harsher Penalties for Sexual Assault, TIME (June 23, 2016),
http://time.com/4379272/brock-turner-sexual-assault-new-legislation [https://perma.cc/UFQ3MGA6]; RECALL JUDGE AARON PERSKY, http://www.recallaaronpersky.com [https://perma.cc/
Q898-3HWH] (campaigning to recall Judge Aaron Persky because of his perceived light sentence
of Turner).
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piece of scholarship, reform suggestion, and legislation over the past
several years includes transparency as a whole or partial solution to
perceived problems with policing.42
At first glance, it is hard to argue with the notion that transparency
is an unqualified good when it comes to public officials, particularly
those public officials with the power to violently impact the lives of so
many citizens.43 Citizen video has brought home to the public the brutal
and unnecessary behavior that the police would rather keep a secret—
an officer shooting a fleeing man in the back,44 choking a man to
death,45 shooting a legal gun owner in his car while a child watches,46 or
body slamming a black teenage girl at a pool party, just to name a few
recent and lurid examples.47
And in some of these cases, public video has contradicted lies that
were carefully constructed by police officers to cover up clear
violations of policy and public trust, if not criminal law, as in the case
of the shooting of Laquan McDonald in Chicago.48 It is not surprising
that these revelations have led to a marked increase in calls for more
visibility into the official decision making of police departments and

42. See infra notes 55–67.
43. Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra note 8, at 1247–48 (“[B]ecause of the power
wielded by frontline officers and the high social cost of officer misconduct, the public [should]
have greater input in the development of police disciplinary procedures. Unlike other public
employees, police officers generally carry firearms, make investigatory stops, conduct arrests, and
use lethal force when needed.”).
44. The Post and Courier, Walter Scott Shooting, VIMEO (Apr. 7, 2015, 2:48 PM),
https://vimeo.com/124336782 [https://perma.cc/P596-3Y53].
45. ‘I Can’t Breathe’: Eric Garner Put in Chokehold by NYPD Officer – Video, GUARDIAN
(Dec. 4, 2014, 2:46 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2014/dec/04/i-cant-breatheeric-garner-chokehold-death-video [https://perma.cc/G5EV-ZKXH].
46. Woman Streams Graphic Video of Boyfriend Shot by Police, CNN (July 7, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/videos/us/2016/07/07/graphic-video-minnesota-police-shooting-philandocastile-ryan-young-pkg-nd.cnn/video/playlists/philando-castile-shot-in-minnesota [https://
perma.cc/QC9U-KAP8].
47. Coreshift, Brandon Brooks (filmed McKinney Pool Video) on New Day June 10, 2015,
YOUTUBE (June 10, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3leCfP8WT0s [https://perma.cc/
4NRD-E9GP].
48. Before contradictory video was released to the public, the officers involved in the Laquan
McDonald shooting told an untruthful, exculpatory version of the night’s events. See, e.g., Megan
Crepeau et al., Three Chicago Cops Indicted in Alleged Cover-Up of Laquan McDonald Shooting
Details, CHI. TRIB. (June 28, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/laquanmcdonald/ctlaquan-mcdonald-shooting-charges-20170627-story.html [https://perma.cc/QW56-X5AH]; see
also Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra note 8, at 1193–94 (arguing that the officer who shot
McDonald might not have been on the force if the public had been aware of the past allegations
of brutality against him).
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the individual actions of police officers.49 This Part examines the way
scholars, politicians, and even police departments themselves believe
transparency will solve a large swath of policing problems. This Part
then theorizes that our focus on the transparency cure for policing
ignores both the limitations of visibility and its potential negative
consequences.50
Policing scholars and reform advocates have taken Louis
Brandeis’s famous adage that “[s]unlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants” as gospel when it comes to police reform.51 The highestprofile example of the transparency cure has been the proliferation of
policies requiring police to wear body cameras.52 And while a debate
continues about when and what footage should be publicly
disseminated,53 body cameras are unquestionably part of policing
reform, and they are a high-profile advertisement for police
departments who aim to show a commitment to visibility.54 Beyond

49. See infra Part II.C.
50. See infra Part I.
51. Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WKLY. (Dec. 20, 1913), reprinted
in LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92, 92 (1914).
52. MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS & MAJOR COUNTY SHERIFFS, SURVEY OF TECHNOLOGY NEEDS
– BODY WORN CAMERAS 2 (2015) (reporting that 97 percent of survey responders said they used
or planned to use body-worn cameras).
53. Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 ALA. L.
REV. 395, 400–01 (2016) (“Only a few states have succeeded in enacting legislation defining the
rules for public disclosure of body camera footage containing private information. Other state
legislatures have explicitly delegated the job of fleshing out the details of body camera policies to
law enforcement officials.” (citations omitted)); Mary Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 476 (2017) (“Many well-meaning lawmakers, activists, and members of
the general public do not seem particularly attentive to the fact that no matter how benign or
socially useful, police cameras are a powerful form of surveillance that have the potential to
jeopardize the privacy of individuals at their most vulnerable.”).
54. A prominent example of the press exposure that a police chief can achieve by promising
and delivering on certain aspects of transparency is the breathless coverage of the Dallas Police
Chief’s transparency promises. See Radley Balko, What the Dallas Police Department Does Right
– And Why Doing Those Things Could Now Be More Difficult, WASH. POST (July 8, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2016/07/08/what-dallas-pd-does-right-andwhy-doing-those-things-could-now-be-more-difficult/?utm_term=.695a76bc1a66
[https://
perma.cc/4EFH-ANFN]; Christopher I. Haugh, How the Dallas Police Department Reformed
Itself, ATLANTIC (July 9, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/dallaspolice/490583 [https://perma.cc/SQV2-YHRM]. But see George Joseph, Is the Dallas Police
Department a Model for Reform? Depends on Which Part of Dallas You’re From, CITYLAB (July
14, 2016), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/07/is-the-dallas-police-department-a-model-forreform/490610 [https://perma.cc/9X5L-FY43] (citing a police reform advocate for noting that
“[t]he problem with the nature of most of the Dallas police reforms being discussed . . . is that it
is an attempt to build trust with better public relations without actually addressing the problem
of over-policing in communities of color”).
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body cameras, transparency is a core reform suggestion in almost every
recent scholarly proposal regarding policing problems.
Policing scholars have embraced transparency with open arms.
Much prominent scholarship of the last several years makes
transparency a central tenet of reform, no matter which particular
policing problem the article addresses.55 Numerous scholars have
written about transparency’s ambitious potential when it comes to
police governance and oversight; they suggest open rulemaking,56
recommend greater transparency for civilian oversight,57 urge state and
federal review of policing practices,58 collect data on the police to
ensure they know the public is watching,59 and call for the regulation of
private police forces.60 Transparent policing policies are also
considered a partial antidote to the “legal estrangement” that historical
policing practices have created in overpoliced communities of color.61
In addition, transparency is also suggested as a cure for collective
bargaining agreements that many see as too protective of police
interests62 and as contributing to violent police-citizen encounters.63
Similarly, Fourth Amendment scholars contend that the public must
come up with “new transparency and accountability mechanisms” to

55. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827,
1835 (2015).
56. Id. at 1832.
57. Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in
the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 504
(2008).
58. Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1071,
1140 (2017) (“[T]he executive branch should institute direct review of . . . [the] police from the
highest levels of the executive branch and create transparency of broad—not case-specific—
criminal justice data to the public.”).
59. Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and Police
Regulation by Data-Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 129 (2012) (“When police are
subject to the watchful gaze of courts, the public, and self-surveillance, they behave in better
conformity with expectations.” (citation omitted)).
60. Stephen Rushin, The Regulation of Private Police, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 159, 162 (2012)
(“[L]egislatures should create laws that mandate private police transparency, afford aggrieved
parties with an efficient means of redress, and ensure public accountability.”).
61. Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE
L.J. 2054, 2144–45 (2017) (“Transparency measures, including data collection and ‘hot ticket’
reforms such as police officer body cameras, can also contribute to the overall democratization of
policing in a way that could begin to root out legal estrangement.” (citation omitted)).
62. Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra note 8, at 1204.
63. Stephen Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117, 160 (2016)
(arguing that data collection on police shootings could help improve the efficacy of federal
prosecutions of police).
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keep up with police department acquisition of new technologies to
surveil citizens.64
Scholars who focus on the process of arrests and prosecutions also
see a major role for transparency in reforming problematic aspects of
these processes. These include ensuring that interrogations are
videotaped in order to reduce coerced confessions65 and promoting
greater transparency about “when officers choose to get involved in a
plea [bargain]” in order to understand the major role police play in this
process.66 Former President Barack Obama has also touted
transparency in his renewed turn as a legal academic. In his 2017
Harvard Law Review article, he suggests that transparency must be a
major pillar of reforming police practices.67 A full accounting of
transparency’s appearance in policing scholarship would be
impracticable and unproductive, but the above list exemplifies the
myriad problems transparency is thought to address and the many
prominent scholars who have embraced the transparency cure for
policing.
Many police departments seeking increased legitimacy in the
neighborhoods they serve also embrace the values of transparency.68
And, even more than the scholars who initially theorized these ideas,
police departments appear to believe that transparency is an end in and
of itself, rather than a helpful but incomplete tool of reform.69 It is

64. Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big Data, and
Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 32 (2016) (“When the police can watch many more
people and activities with increasing sophistication and at lower cost, we need new transparency
and accountability mechanisms.”).
65. Tonja Jacobi, Miranda 2.0, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 47 (2016) (“Greater access to cheap
technology could considerably improve police transparency, at little cost. In particular, requiring
audiovisual recording of all interrogations would not only help establish actual coercion in some
cases, it would reinforce Miranda’s ‘civilizing’ effect on police behavior.” (citation omitted)).
66. Jonathan Abel, Cops and Pleas: Police Officers’ Influence on Plea Bargaining, 126 YALE
L.J. 1730, 1734 (2017) (suggesting that transparency about “when officers choose to get involved
in a plea” bargain is essential to understanding the “normative implications of police influence on
plea bargaining”).
67. Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV.
L. REV. 811, 840–41 (2017) (noting that his policing task force unanimously “recommended steps
for transparency” (citation omitted)).
68. Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712,
730 (2017) (“Today, most departments claim that they are engaged in community policing.”
(citation omitted)).
69. Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement”
Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 795 (2016) (“Under the
Obama administration, almost all consent decrees signed with a police department include a
‘community engagement’ section. These provisions, numbering anywhere from seven to forty
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possible that police departments want to undertake transparency
measures to actually increase trust with communities. However, such
statements also have an enormous side benefit: police departments that
undertake “transparency” measures have received important public
relations boosts from such promises. This is imperative for an
institution that has been under fire from the popular media in recent
years.70 It is not surprising, then, that police departments all over the
country are taking up the rallying cry of transparency as the cure for
police brutality, racism, and other systemic problems. Whether
committed to reform or not, there appears to be no downside to touting
increased transparency for these departments.
One could be forgiven for believing that all policing problems start
with secrecy and are solved by visibility.71 Certainly, transparency is an
essential feature of good governance. That said, there are theoretical
and practical problems with the notion that transparency can cure
policing problems or even that it is an unqualified good in all aspects
of policing. In particular, there are significant issues with transparency
as it relates to individuals.
While policing scholars see transparency as an unqualified good,
scholars in other areas have argued that there are serious tradeoffs that
come with overreliance on visibility. In the context of forcing more
transparency from financial institutions, Frederick Schauer notes that
Brandeis’s sunlight mantra “provided a slogan that has subsequently
been deployed by countless advocates in urging what appear to them
to be the self-evident virtues of openness and full disclosure, and thus
of transparency.”72 Not even Brandeis himself, however, saw
transparency as an unmitigated good. In fact, it was he who theorized
our “modern right to privacy.”73 This conception of privacy has as one
of its “most important dimensions . . . a right against transparency.”74
While our modern conception of privacy is multifaceted, the
importance of protecting ourselves from transparency can be seen in
paragraphs, require community engagement as part of the respective police department’s reform
process.” (citations omitted)).
70. Id. at 793–95.
71. Pozen, supra note 23, at 20 (“As a norm of public administration, transparency’s stature
has only grown. Groups on all sides of the political spectrum swear fealty to it.” (citation
omitted)).
72. Frederick Schauer, The Mixed Blessings of Financial Transparency, 31 YALE J. ON REG.
809, 809 (2014) (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 814 (citation omitted); see also Pozen, supra note 23, at 7 (noting that Brandeis’s
focus was not governmental transparency but corporate transparency).
74. Schauer, supra note 72, at 814.
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the tort of invasion of privacy:
At the heart of this version of the right to privacy is the right to control
the facts about one’s own life and thus a right against the publication
of essentially accurate but non-newsworthy information. Insofar as
the typical violation of this aspect of the right to privacy can be
understood as the making transparent of that which the right-holder
wishes to keep secret, the claim of the right to privacy is at the same
time a claim against transparency.75

More globally, Schauer begins to problematize the notion that
transparency is always a goal worth pursuing: “Once we realize that
few of us wear transparent clothes, live in transparent houses, or have
transparent bathroom doors, we can begin to glimpse the possibility
that transparency is not necessarily something to be pursued at all
times and in all contexts.”76
Transparency should not be a goal in and of itself. Rather, it must
be in service to some higher goal.77 This is because transparency
necessarily means a loss of privacy—a problem ignored by the many
advocates of transparency. There is always a tradeoff. This tradeoff is
implicit, if not explicit, in legislation designed to protect personal
information in the digital age. Julie Cohen identified the core
theoretical difficulty with dissemination of personal information
almost two decades ago: “[T]he idea that ‘privacy’ might encompass an
enforceable right to prevent the sharing of (certain kinds of)
personally-identified data seems to conflict with deeply held social
values that elevate choice over constraint, freedom of speech over
enforced silence, and ‘sunlight’ over shadow.”78 Privacy-protection
efforts have ramped up as data collection and dissemination has
become seamless and instant due to modern computing databases. The
dozens of privacy-related statutes that have been passed in the last
quarter century or so “seem to share one galvanizing interest:
technology.”79
Privacy scholars in a number of different areas are grappling with
what exactly dissemination of personal data does to long-cherished

75. Id. at 815 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 814.
77. Pozen, supra note 23, at 3 (arguing that transparency should not be seen “as an end in
itself, but rather as a means to achieve particular social goods” (citation omitted)).
78. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2000).
79. Murphy, supra note 29, at 499.
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notions of self-determination and individuality.80 Among the most
salient concerns with the technological capability to collect and
disseminate personal data is that it leads to judgments based on partial
information: “[T]he information in databases often fails to capture the
texture of our lives. Rather than provide a nuanced portrait of our
personalities, databases capture the stereotypes and the brute facts of
what we do without the reasons.”81 To describe the problems with
basing judgments of individuals on incomplete information, scholars
often turn to criminal records as exemplifying such problems. Daniel J.
Solove notes that “a record of an arrest without the story or reason is
misleading.”82 He notes that an arrest for “civil disobedience in the
1960s” is likely to be recorded with “some vague label, such as
disorderly conduct, slapped onto it.”83 Arrest records leave a person
“reconstituted in databases as a digital persona composed of
data . . . distort[ing] who we are.”84
Of course, the right to privacy for an individual private citizen is
not the same thing as the right to privacy for elected government
officials or, perhaps, even for individuals, like the police, who work for
an elected government.85 But before calling for transparency from
individual police officers regarding their employment history, we
80. See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, The Right to Erasure: Privacy, Data Brokers, and the
Indefinite Retention of Data, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 433 (2014) (arguing that a “right to
erasure” is justified by the permanency of personal data on the internet and the lack of control
individuals have over use of their personal information); Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust:
Sharing Personal Information in a Networked World, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559 (2015) (arguing
that information shared in “trust” should be protected and that this concept of privacy is best for
protecting individual privacy in the internet age); Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data
Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 733 (2016) (noting that government access to private data
is a global problem).
81. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1425 (2001); see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The
“Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547, 552 (2017) (“[I]t is not the corporal
person, alone, that deserves protection, but also the information about the person. It is not the
sheaf of papers, but the revealing personal details in those words that matter.”).
82. Solove, supra note 81, at 1425.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See generally, e.g., Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2000)
(arguing that democratic policing requires transparency). But see David Alan Sklansky, Police
and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1829 (2005). Sklansky agrees with Luna that
transparency is currently important to democratic policing, but he notes that “always, there are
trade-offs. Sometimes effective law enforcement depends on a degree of secrecy . . . Less
obviously, there are trade-offs here between different components of democracy. Deliberative
self-governance often requires a degree of confidentiality. That is why the Constitutional
Convention met behind closed doors.” Id.
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should at least have a sense of whether the publicized information will
lead to the reforms we seek; in doing so, we should consider the privacy
and policy implications of insisting on such disclosure.86
While much of the scholarship touting transparency as a cure for
policing problems concerns itself with data-level information, rather
than with publicizing facts about individual officers, advocates around
the country would like to see this change. This is not surprising given
the public attention to violent citizen-police encounters and the highly
publicized inability to hold such officers criminally accountable.
Advocates are now calling for a very granular, individual level of
forced transparency—that of individual PDRs.87 Advocates for more
transparency in policing see PDR secrecy as leading to the protection
of bad police officers and the avoidable deaths of civilians.88 To hear
advocates tell it, publicizing PDRs has no downside and is a powerful
tool in the fight against bad police officers and the departments that
shield them from just consequences.89
This Article calls for caution regarding publicizing PDRs and
regarding transparency as a cure for policing problems more generally.
As David E. Pozen writes—when discussing transparency as a global
solution to many perceived governmental ills—we should “engag[e]
with transparency in more skeptical, instrumental, and institutionally
sensitive terms.”90 As the next parts describe, PDR transparency is not
a panacea, nor does it necessarily solve the problems its advocates
believe it will. This Article instead argues that the move to make police
discipline transparent should not proceed without serious
consideration of the ways in which PDR transparency mirrors the
publication and wide dissemination of criminal records.91 As I have
argued in the past, what the police desire for themselves can and should
serve as an aspirational model for a reformed criminal justice system.92
Thus, we should take police calls for privacy seriously, not only because
they may have legitimate reasons to desire privacy for themselves, but
also because these calls parallel and amplify the years of scholarship
critiquing the many problems with criminal record transparency.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See infra Parts II.C & III.B.
See infra Part III.A.2.
See infra Part III.A.
See id.
Pozen, supra note 23, at 3.
See infra Part III.B.
See supra note 22.
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II. POLICE DISCIPLINARY RECORDS

Police officers are under tremendous scrutiny. They are often
blamed for systemic issues in the criminal justice system when
culpability is equally assignable to prosecutors, judges, and
legislators.93 While police suffer, arguably unfairly, from this
scapegoating, they do have a good deal of control—through their
unions and lobbying power—over how they are treated by employers
and other governmental bodies.94 Even more apparent is the control
officers, through powerful unions, possess over internal discipline. It
turns out that keeping demands for informational transparency at bay
is one of the most frequently demanded police protections.95 This littlestudied protection has come under scrutiny recently in New York and
California, two states that are among the most protective in the
country.96
93. A good example of this phenomenon is the outcry over marijuana arrests. Although
legislators are responsible for criminalizing marijuana possession—as are prosecutors for
continuing to pursue charges against marijuana possession—the media and public tend to focus
outrage on the police. See, e.g., Jesse Wegman, Editorial, The Injustice of Marijuana Arrests, N.Y.
TIMES (July 28, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/opinion/high-time-the-injustice-ofmarijuana-arrests.html [https://perma.cc/75HU-PBCU] (“[P]olice departments that presumably
have far more important things to do waste an enormous amount of time and taxpayer money
chasing a drug that two states have already legalized and that a majority of Americans believe
should be legal everywhere.”).
94. Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447, 1472–1477
(2016).
95. Collective bargaining agreements supplement considerable statutory and constitutional
protections of police officers:
In at least sixteen states, police additionally have statutory rights to certain procedures
in the investigation of misconduct under Law Enforcement Officers Bills of Rights
(“LEOBORs”) as well as civil service protections in many other states. Supplementing
these constitutional and statutory protections are police union contracts, which contain
additional procedural and substantive protections against discipline.
See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 68, at 718–19 (citations omitted); see also Jason Mazzone &
Stephen Rushin, From Selma to Ferguson: The Voting Rights Act as a Blueprint for Police Reform,
105 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 307–09 (2017) (“[P]olice union contracts in many cities contain provisions
requiring purges of disciplinary files.” (citation omitted)); Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra
note 8, at 1211 (“Police officers have secured . . . extensive protections [for] disciplinary
procedures . . . .”).
96. In New York, a bill has been introduced in the state assembly to repeal the law that
protects police PDRs, see Assemb. B. A03333, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), and several
lawsuits with the same aim are working their way through the New York court system. See Colby
Hamilton, State Court of Appeals Declines to Hear Police Officer Record Shield Suit, N.Y. L.J.
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/sites/newyorklawjournal/2017/12/
19/state-court-of-appeals-declines-to-hear-police-officer-record-shield-suit [https://perma.cc/
NU2U-TT89] (noting that several other cases are also pending in the courts). In California, a bill
to make PDRs more public was introduced but ultimately defeated in the legislative assembly.
S.B. 1286, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016). In 2018, a modified bill to release records only in use-
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PDRs are rarely addressed in the scholarly literature.97 They are,
however, a major part of police collective bargaining agreements and
lobbying.98 In short, how police officers are disciplined and who has
access to PDRs is a key issue to individual officers and their unions.
Once an understanding of how discipline works and what might be
included in a PDR is achieved, it becomes easy to see why police
officers might care about their privacy in this realm. Accordingly, it
also becomes harder to suggest that making PDRs public has no
drawbacks.
This Part begins by explaining what PDRs are and how police
discipline works. It addresses the status of privacy and transparency for
PDRs in different states, and examines how the importance of privacy
to police officers is reflected in collective bargaining agreements
privacy-protective state statutes. It then turns to the arguments made
in favor of full transparency for PDRs—including that publication will
lead to fewer civilian fatalities—while raising both theoretical and
practical questions about such claims.
A. The Current State of PDRs
There is no standard for PDRs, as they differ from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, and state to state, but some generalizations may be made.
This Section describes generally what PDRs are, and it explains how
such records are treated in all fifty states.
1. What Is a PDR? The question posed as the heading for this
Section seems simple. The answers, however, are far more complicated
and technical than one might imagine. Moreover, even attempting to
describe these records generally suggests a coherence throughout

of-force and sexual assault cases was introduced and signed into law. S.B. 1421, 2017–2018 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2018); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 832.7–.8 (West 2018).
97. There are few articles that address PDRs, either directly or as part of a larger discussion.
See generally Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot, supra note 12 (addressing prosecutor access to misconduct
files for Brady purposes); Bies, supra note 12; Conti-Cook, supra note 8 (arguing that records
should be made available to litigants); Fisk & Richardson, supra note 68 (mentioning PDRs,
though primarily addressing police unions more generally); Moran, supra note 12 (arguing that
misconduct investigations should be more transparent); Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra
note 8 (discussing PDRs as part of a larger argument about problems with collective bargaining
negotiation over disciplinary procedures).
98. Levine, Police Suspects, supra note 22, at 1220–27 (discussing the procedural protections
many police officers receive during interrogations); Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra note
8, at 1191, 1196–98 (discussing collective bargaining agreements that have “laundry list[s]” of
protections from internal investigations).
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states, counties, cities, and towns that simply does not exist. Police
departments and governance vary widely. That said, for the purposes
of this paper, some generalizations about disciplinary records must
suffice.
PDRs are part of an officer’s personnel file. That file contains
everything about the officer’s employment history, including
commendations, promotions, and demotions. Illinois, for example,
describes a “personnel record” as “documents which are, have been or
are intended to be used in determining that employee’s qualifications
for employment, promotion, transfer, additional compensation,
discharge or other disciplinary action.”99 Access to the personnel files
of government employees is the subject of statutes in all fifty states.
Depending on the state, or even the locality, a police officer’s
disciplinary record may contain reports from many different sources.
The many ways an officer can acquire a disciplinary file are
demonstrated by an unsuccessful bill to make California disciplinary
records more transparent. The bill describes disciplinary records as
emanating from
[I]nvestigations or proceedings conducted by civilian review agencies,
inspectors general, personnel boards, police commissions, civil service
commissions, city councils, boards of supervisors, or any entities
empowered to investigate peace officer misconduct on behalf of an
agency, conduct audits of peace officer discipline on behalf of an
agency, adjudicate complaints against peace officers or custodial
officers, hear administrative appeals, or set policies or funding for the
law enforcement agency.100

Some charges, like those from civilian complaint review boards
(“CCRBs”), must be investigated and substantiated before disciplinary
action is recommended.101 Such investigations may be quite thorough
and lengthy.102 Additionally, in many jurisdictions, officers have the

99. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/2 (2018).
100. S.B. 1286, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016).
101. See Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV. BOARD,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/ccrb/about/frequently-asked-questions-faq.page
[https://perma.cc/
JAG8-B4LW] (noting that the CCRB substantiates charges and then recommends discipline to
police chiefs, but that it cannot discipline officers itself).
102. For instance, New York’s CCRB substantiated charges against Daniel Pantaleo for
misconduct during the killing of Eric Garner more than three years after the event took place.
See Matt Taibbi, Civilian Review Board Substantiates Charges Against Policeman in Eric Garner
Case, ROLLING STONE (Sept. 8, 2017, 2:47 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/
politics/features/ccrb-substantiates-charges-against-policeman-in-eric-garner-case-w501745
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right to appeal many, if not all, disciplinary charges or actions against
them, whether that discipline be supervisory or stemming from an
independent review.103 Thus, at any given moment, an officer’s
personnel record may have charges that are “unsubstantiated,”
meaning either that they have not been investigated or have been
investigated and found to be without merit.104
It is easy to think that disciplinary records contain only the most
serious, and civilian-related, complaints, but this is simply untrue.
Disciplinary records can, and inevitably will, contain charges of a much
less serious nature: lateness, not wearing the proper uniform, or poor
driving on a training day, for example. The punishments, too, range
from minor—“verbal counseling” or a “memo of correction”—to
severe, as with termination. The variety of potential infractions and the
sanctions resulting from them are far more complex than the casual
observer might imagine.
To understand how byzantine internal police discipline is, one
need only look at attempts by police departments to explain and
simplify their processes. Madison, Wisconsin, publishes on its website
a simplifying matrix that shows all possible infractions, the level of
sanction each infraction may occasion, and what each sanction
means.105 The purpose of the matrix is to make clearer to officers and
the public what Madison’s disciplinary process looks like. These
infractions are representative of possible infractions for any officer in
any police department, though they are not necessarily standardized
across departments.106 Madison’s matrix is reproduced here to show
that even when an agency tries to simplify discipline, the varying
complaints, procedures, and sanctions are numerous, and the
sanctioning process varied and complex.

[https://perma.cc/HC8X-AV95] (noting that brutality charges often take a long time to
substantiate).
103. See Fred Grimm, Arbitration Allows Shabby Cops to Escape Real World Consequences,
MIAMI HERALD (June 15, 2017), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/news-columnsblogs/fred-grimm/article156447984.html [https://perma.cc/MPP7-JGQR] (noting that in Florida,
police officers may appeal departmental decisions to fire them, and that often the arbitrators
deciding those appeals overturn the firings).
104. See supra note 101.
105. CITY OF MADISON POLICE DEP’T, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE,
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND INTERNAL AFFAIRS DISCIPLINE MATRIX 10–12 (2018),
https://www.cityofmadison.com/police/documents/sop/PSIAdiscMatrix.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
V2C7-LCMK].
106. See Darrel W. Stephens, Police Discipline: A Case for Change 3–4 (Papers from the Harv.
Exec. Session on Policing & Pub. Safety, June 2011).
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This representative sample of a document aimed at clarifying
discipline paints a picture of the many sanctions—ranging from minor
to serious—that a PDR could contain. It is worth noting here that the
Madison Police Department’s matrix and explanation represents the
lodestar of what experts in police discipline consider clarity. In a report
authored by Darrel W. Stephens of Harvard’s Kennedy School that
criticizes the complex nature of discipline for officers, he discusses a
similarly simplified matrix as an example of a clarified disciplinary
system.107
107. Id. at 11.
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To illustrate the discretion and arbitrariness that such rules might
engender, let us return to the Chicago Police officers disciplined for
making a political statement while in uniform by kneeling in support of
athletes who protest police brutality.108 What sanctions from the above
list could apply to these officers if they worked for the Madison, rather
than the Chicago, Police Department? At least nine Category B
sanctions, which include a “letter of reprimand,” could be read to apply
to the behavior of these kneeling officers and the subsequent posting
of the photograph on Instagram:
1. “Engaging in activity on duty that does not pertain to
MPD business”;109
2. “Employees shall not publicly criticize the operations
or personnel of the MPD if such criticism undermines
the discipline, morale or efficiency of the MPD. This
applies both on and off duty”;110
3. “Employees shall not use any MPD property for
private purposes [without permission]”;111
4. “Failure to be courteous to the public and to
coworkers . . . avoid actions that would cause disrespect
to the MPD”;112
5. “Employees shall not act so as to exhibit disrespect
for a supervisor”;113
6. “Employees shall not speak derogatorily to others
about orders or instructions issued by supervisors”;114
7. “Failure to adhere to personal appearance code of
conduct described in the SOP [Standard Operating
Procedure]”;115
8. “Failure . . . to appropriately represent MPD
honestly, respectfully, and/or legally while on- or offduty through the use of social media. Personnel are
expected to represent the Core Values of the MPD at

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See Clark, supra note 2.
CITY OF MADISON POLICE DEP’T, supra note 105, at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
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all times even when using the internet for personal
purposes.”116
Category B sanctions themselves are not particularly onerous, but
any and all of these infractions would presumably appear in these
officers’ personnel files, without the context of the events appearing
alongside them. More to the point, the choice of which, if any, of these
charges should be brought against the officers is entirely up to their
supervisors. These decisions may be made fairly and evenhandedly, or
they may be based on how seriously the supervisor adheres to the MPD
code of conduct, or they may even be made based on a supervisor’s
preference, explicit or implicit, for certain officers or types of officers.
It is not difficult to draw an inference, then, that an officer’s
disciplinary file may have as much to do with his supervisor’s attitude
and biases as it does with his adherence to the code—let alone his
quality as an officer, as defined by those of us who are policed, rather
than those who are doing the disciplining.117 Anecdotal evidence bears
this speculation out. In Columbus, Ohio, where the population is 40
percent people of color but the police command is entirely white, a
black sergeant named Melissa McFadden faced possible termination
over alleged favoritism toward a black officer. She also, it turns out,
has helped subordinates file racial-discrimination claims against the
department. On the other hand, a white officer who referred to two
black colleagues with the N-word received no more than a written
sanction.118 In another example, a New York transit officer filed a
federal lawsuit in 2015, charging that he was disciplined for not racially
profiling subway riders. In a secret recording, his supervisor was heard
to say that the people jumping over turnstiles were largely black and
Hispanic, while the officer had more arrests for “women and whites.”
The supervisor then reprimanded him for being “fully aware of it
and . . . not targeting those people.”119 These anecdotes support the
116. Id. at 6. Presumably, this last potential violation would apply only if the officers knew
their images were being used on Instagram.
117. I say this because the advocates for publicizing records are individuals who care about
how police treat the public, not police officers concerned about fellow officers violating police
codes of conduct.
118. George Joseph, An Inside Look at an Ohio Police Force’s Race Problem, APPEAL (Aug.
13,
2018),
https://theappeal.org/columbus-ohio-police-department-racism-retaliationdiscrimination [https://perma.cc/9WWA-4GQE].
119. John Marzulli, Exclusive: NYPD Cop Claims He Was Punished for Not Stopping Enough
Black,
Hispanic
Teens
in
Subways,
N.Y.
Daily
News
(Jan.
7,
2016),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/nypd-admits-quotas-summons-article-1.2488316
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admittedly speculative concern that when discipline is so discretionary
and police command is so often homogeneous, disciplinary actions may
be unevenly enforced against officers who are not part of the dominant,
white, male, heterosexual group. Such concerns are bolstered by the
many lawsuits alleging racial bias in police departments throughout the
country.120
Scholars have long noted the complexity of our criminal codes and
vagueness of criminal laws, and the arbitrary enforcement made
possible by such complexity.121 The very same criticism could be lodged
about police discipline: there are innumerable possible ways to violate
police procedures and many ways for a supervisor or outside agency to
interpret an action by an officer. Whether an officer is disciplined has
as much to do with the personal preferences of those doing the
disciplining as it does with the officer’s actual behavior toward civilians
or with the kind of professionalism that most concerns the public.122
When one begins to consider the amount of discretion on the part of
supervisors, managers, and agencies that can go into making up a police
officer’s disciplinary file, it becomes easier to understand why police
officers might legitimately worry about such records becoming public.

[https://perma.cc/75LL-6BN4]. A later article notes that the supervisor responsible for these racist
statements has been promoted rather than disciplined. See Edwin Raymond, The Racist NYPD
Captain Who Ruined My Career for Not Targeting Enough Blacks and Hispanics Got Promoted,
N.Y. Daily News (June 23, 2016), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/joins-class-action-suitnypd-article-1.2685918 [https://perma.cc/2VMU-3RCJ].
120. One author describes the racial disparity in police disciplinary action in New York, as
well as official explanations for that disparity that, of course, are racially neutral:
The discipline of black and Hispanic officers brought up on departmental charges has
been a simmering issue in New York for years, spurred in part by the Latino Officers
Association’s complaints of a double standard. Last year, a task force . . . concluded
that minority officers were more likely than white officers to face punishments in the
police discipline process, but that the disparity was not the result of discrimination. The
department has contended that more minority officers have been disciplined because
they were involved more often in serious infractions that carry mandatory penalties.
Benjamin Weiser, 14 Minority Officers Sue Police Force, Alleging Bias in Disciplinary Practices,
N.Y. TIMES (1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/10/nyregion/14-minority-officers-suepolice-force-alleging-bias-in-disciplinary-practices.html [https://perma.cc/5PW2-8DN9].
121. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Vagueness Principles, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1137, 1145 (2016)
(describing how “the enactment of broad, overlapping criminal codes and the significant
enforcement discretion given to prosecutors . . . result in a lack of notice [and] permit arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement”).
122. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 38, at 586–89 (describing several cases where officers were
disciplined for, among other things, nonmarital sex and intra-office dating between officers of
different ranks).
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2. The State of Privacy-Transparency for Disciplinary Records.
This Section gives a general overview of the complicated and varied
states of privacy and transparency for PDRs. It then addresses how
privacy of disciplinary records, in states where it exists, represents a
major feature of collective bargaining negotiations or lobbying by
police unions.123
Whether or not disciplinary records are public is primarily a
matter of state law. All states have laws that dictate what records from
government agencies and their employees are public, but these laws
have many exceptions. PDRs are often among the records exempted
from public disclosure, except upon a motion in a criminal or civil
case.124 One can categorize the states’ records into private, limited
access, and public, but among these categories, there are significant
variations across states and even across jurisdictions within each
state.125
Three states—California, Delaware, and New York—have
statutes that make PDRs private.126 In twenty other states, including
the District of Columbia, records are confidential, either by policy or
practice.127 In some of these states, like Colorado, all public-employee
personnel records are confidential;128 in others, police are given a
presumption of privacy.129 In the latter group of states, there are

123. See Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra note 8, at 1228–32.
124. See N.Y. CIV. RTS. LAW § 50-a (McKinney 2014).
124. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-240 (2017) (providing that police personnel records only be
made available upon court order); see also Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot, supra note 12, at 745
(describing the range of availability of disciplinary records, and noting that in some jurisdictions,
even prosecutors cannot access these records).
125. WNYC, an NPR affiliate, has an easy-to-use tool that lists all the state statutes pertaining
to whether disciplinary records are available through public record request. See WNYC, Is Police
Misconduct a Secret in Your State?, https://project.wnyc.org/disciplinary-records
[https://perma.cc/L5X7-C69E]. Although I cite at times to the WNYC tool, all state statutes
reported by the tool have been independently verified for accuracy.
126. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.7 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002(l)(1)
(2015); N.Y. CIV. RTS. LAW § 50-a.
127. WNYC, supra note 125; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-240.
128. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-240.
129. See MD. CODE ANN., General Provisions § 4-311 (LexisNexis 2018).
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procedures for accessing these records for litigation purposes.130 In
Maryland, records remain private even from the officer herself.131
Fifteen states have a mixture of public disclosure and
confidentiality for police records.132 Publication in some states depends
on the severity of the infraction, while the case law and policies of other
states allow publication to vary by police department. For example, in
Arkansas, records remain private unless the person requesting them
can show a “compelling public interest in their disclosure.”133 In Texas,
charges that trigger only minor forms of discipline—a “written
reprimand” or less—remain private.134
In twelve states, records are considered public,135 but “public”
means very different things. For example, a Connecticut statute makes
PDRs private if disclosure would constitute an “invasion of personal
privacy.”136 The Connecticut Supreme Court, however, has interpreted
this provision very narrowly, so that most records are accessible.137
Some of these “public” records states do not make unsubstantiated
charges public.138 States like Florida, Georgia, and Maine, on the other
hand, make all disciplinary decisions public; privacy is given only to
charges under open investigation.139
Privacy regimes vary from state to state and from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. There has been no study to date of what effect each regime
has on police accountability, use of force, or any other reform issue.
Despite this paucity of knowledge, advocates on both sides are
confident that PDRs are either a necessary accountability measure, or
a dangerous and unwise invasion of police privacy.

130. In California, for instance, such requests are known as Pitchess motions, named for the
case that set out the standards for requesting such records. See Pitchess v. Superior Court, 522
P.2d 305 (Cal. 1974). For a typology of access to state disciplinary records for Brady purposes, see
Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot, supra note 12, at 762–79.
131. MD. CODE ANN., General Provisions § 4-311.
132. WNYC, supra note 125.
133. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(c)(1) (2018).
134. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 143.1216, 143.123 (2017).
135. WNYC, supra note 125.
136. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-210 (2018).
137. See Perkins v. Freedom of Information Comm’n, 635 A.2d 783, 787, 791 (Conn. 1993)
(construing narrowly exemptions to the state Freedom of Information Act’s (“FOIA”) general
rule of disclosure).
138. See, e.g., UTAH CODE § 63G-2-301(3)(o) (2018).
139. FLA. STAT. § 119.071(2)(k)(1) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-72(a)(8) (2018); ME.
STAT. tit. 5, § 7070(2)(E) (2013).
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B. Privacy Is a Primary Concern for Police Officers
In most states where the police have privacy in their disciplinary
records, such privacy is the product of either collective bargaining
between the union and government or of intense legislative lobbying.140
As Stephen Rushin notes, police unions are singularly powerful
among unions, drawing support from both sides of the aisle:
A majority of American states now permit or require municipalities
to bargain collectively with police unions. According to the best
estimates, around two-thirds of American police officers are part of a
labor union. Police unions generally benefit from broad, bipartisan
support—even from conservative politicians who have fought against
unionization for other government employees.141

Discipline is a major part of negotiations in many jurisdictions. How
officers are disciplined, what kind of appeals they are entitled to, and,
importantly for this Article, control over publication of disciplinary
records are spelled out in contracts. These rights for officers are a
major part of the Law Enforcement Officers Bill of Rights
(“LEOBOR”) in the sixteen states that have these laws.142 These
statutes are largely devoted to the rights of officers in terms of
disciplinary procedures. Delaware’s LEOBOR, in particular, is clear
that privacy is paramount: “All records compiled as a result of any
investigation subject to the provisions of this chapter and/or a
contractual disciplinary grievance procedure shall be and remain
confidential and shall not be released to the public.”143
But even states where disciplinary records are subject to much
more public scrutiny have protections for officer privacy built into their
LEOBORs. West Virginia, for instance, allows publication of
disciplinary records as long as the request does not invade personal

140. New York does not have a state “LEOBOR” but lobbying in the 1970s by police and
advocates led to one of the most privacy-protective state statutes in the country. See Levine, We
Need to Talk, supra note 26, at 2–3, 6.
141. Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra note 8, at 1204 (citations omitted).
142. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1102–1116 (2017); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 3300–3313
(West 2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 9200–9209 (2018); FLA. STAT. § 112.532; 50 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 725/1–7.5 (2018); IOWA CODE § 80F.1 (2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.520 (West 2018);
LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:2531–2535 (2017); MD. CODE ANN., Public Safety §§ 3-101–113 (West
2018); MINN. STAT. §§ 626.84–.863 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 289.020–.120 (2017); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 29-14-1–29-14-11 (West 2018); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-28.6 (2017); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 9.1-500–-507 (2017); W. VA. CODE §§ 8-14A-1–5 (2017); WIS. STAT. § 164.01–.06 (2018).
143. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9200(c)(12).
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privacy.144 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has ruled that
disclosure of on-the-job conduct does not invade privacy.145 Thus, it
would appear that in West Virginia, officer records are mostly made
available to the public. However, a closer look at the state’s exemptions
from open record laws suggests otherwise. One exemption is for
“internal records and notations of such law-enforcement agencies
which are maintained for internal use in matters relating to law
enforcement.”146 This relatively ambiguous phrase may contain
multitudes, depending on who determines what information is
considered internal. More to the point, the officer and the union still
have control, to some extent, over what goes into the personnel file
that is made public.147 It is certainly not hard to imagine that in states
where personnel files are made public to any degree, there is much that
is kept out of the file.
LEOBORs are useful because they make negotiations between
unions and jurisdictions plain. It is easy to see from these statutes what
the police feel they need, in terms of discipline and privacy. Discipline
and privacy also feature in far less visible contracts. This fact was
discovered when a hacker broke into the website of the largest police
union in the country and leaked sixty-seven negotiated contracts to the
Guardian, which reported that 30 percent of these contracts provided
for privacy from publication of disciplinary records.148
In New York, where the state’s highest court has specifically ruled
that disciplinary actions may not be a subject of the New York Police
Department’s (“NYPD”) collective bargaining agreement,149 privacy
was won through legislative lobbying. An intense effort by advocates
to remove this privacy from police has led to an equally intense effort
on the part of the police to keep it, an effort which—like many issues

144. See W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-4.
145. See generally Charleston Gazette v. Smithers, 752 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 2013) (denying a
newspaper’s request for a declaratory judgment under West Virginia’s FOIA for police records
on officer misconduct complaints that the court deemed exempt from disclosure).
146. See W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-4.
147. Id.
148. George Joseph, Leaked Police Files Contain Guarantees Disciplinary Records Will Be
Kept Secret, GUARDIAN (Feb. 7, 2016, 12:00 GMT), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/feb/07/leaked-police-files-contain-guarantees-disciplinary-records-will-be-kept-secret
[https://perma.cc/8PTU-AQ4V].
149. In re Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of N.Y., Inc., 848 N.E.2d 448, 449 (N.Y. 2006) (“We
hold that police discipline may not be a subject of collective bargaining . . . .”).
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law enforcement unions care about—seems to be winning the day so
far in New York’s appellate courts.150
In sum, police use their considerable bargaining and lobbying
power to ensure their personal privacy and to control how their
disciplinary information is disseminated. While certainly not a reason
in itself to be cautious about publicizing PDRs, inquiry into why
privacy is considered so vital to rank and file officers is useful.
Moreover, while advocates for police reform are attacking the privacy
of PDRs as central to police brutality issues, the next Section suggests
that stripping police of this privacy may have little impact on the way
officers are disciplined, and also may have unintended consequences
that will further entrench police discipline problems, rather than
solving them as advocates hope.
C. The Problematic Promise of Publicizing PDRs
In the wake of notorious killings by police, legislators and policereform advocates are attempting to make PDRs a matter of public
record in states where police PDRs have robust privacy protections. In
California, a new statute makes PDRs relating to officer use of force
and other serious charges public. Earlier bills that would have
weakened police PDR privacy further were not successful,151 but
advocates have ramped up media campaigns to rally citizens over the
issue. And a bill to entirely repeal the statute that protects the privacy
of PDRs in New York was introduced in the State Assembly in 2017.152
Advocates extol the benefits of transparency and fiercely critique
the privacy that police have over their disciplinary records.153 The
theory behind such critiques is that privacy in PDRs is a major
impediment to police accountability, keeps bad or “rogue” police
officers on the force, and even contributes to police brutalizing
citizens.154 What is often missing from their accounts, however, is the
mechanism by which transparency would lead to accountability. This is
so with many transparency-related arguments about policing and other

150. See In re Luongo v. Records Access Officer, Civilian Complaint Review Bd., 51 N.Y.S.3d
46, 58 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (holding that the CCRB summary of a police officer’s record is
exempt from disclosure under New York statute), motion for leave to appeal denied, 30 N.Y.3d
908 (N.Y. 2017).
151. See supra note 96.
152. Assemb. B. 3333, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
153. See infra Part III.A.2.
154. See infra Part III.A.1 2.
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areas of governance.155 But, transparency in PDRs not only comes with
significant privacy tradeoffs—ones that have systemic effects beyond
the police, as discussed in the next Part156—but this transparency also
may actually lead to less accountability, given the way police discipline
functions and the discretion that police command has over who is
disciplined and for what.157
Some of the suggested reforms refer to record dissemination in incourt proceedings.158 As I have argued before, making such records
available to criminal defense counsel is wise, useful, and equitable.159
Many advocates, however, aim to publicize PDRs far more widely, to
make them publicly available.160 In this Section, I look at the core
objectives advocates seek from PDR publication, arguing that these
aims are unlikely to be achieved, at least without other systemic
reforms, due to the organizational structure of police departments and
the way internal discipline functions. Forcing PDR transparency may
cause police departments to circle the wagons more tightly, producing
the unintended consequence of fewer reported disciplinary problems
for officers.161 Conversely, when an officer is publicly condemned,
police departments label her a “bad apple,” allowing the department
to ignore the systemic problems that lead to police abuses. Finally,
because of the arbitrary nature of discipline, public PDRs may
scapegoat officers based on racial or other biases far more often than
officers who pose a risk to the communities they serve.
Advocates for PDR publication see PDR transparency as a
partial, if not total, solution to a perceived lack of accountability for
officers who misuse their power. Advocates believe that PDR
publication will accomplish at least two vital things: pressuring the
police into holding violent officers accountable162 and warning the

155. See infra Part III.A.1.
156. See infra Part III.A.1.
157. See infra Part III.A.1.
158. See generally, e.g., Conti-Cook, supra note 8 (arguing the necessity of PDRs for
litigation).
159. Levine, We Need to Talk, supra note 26, at 6–8.
160. See generally Conti-Cook, supra note 8 (arguing for publication of PDRs).
161. In the wake of California’s legislation to make police records more transparent, one
department shredded its records of police shooting investigations. See Dillon & Lau, supra note
28.
162. See, e.g., Ben Fractenberg, Legal Aid Appeals Court Decision to Keep NYPD Records
Secret, DNAINFO (Oct. 6 2017, 1:35 PM), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20171006/civiccenter/legal-aid-nypd-records-appeal [https://perma.cc/YDB8-YV9S] (quoting Tina Luongo,
Attorney-in-Charge, as saying, “[s]o long as acts of police brutality continue to proliferate in black
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public about potentially problematic officers.163 Yet, forcing
transparency from individual officers is unlikely to do either of these
things. In fact, such transparency measures have the potential to
scapegoat officers who do not comply with how the police hierarchy
thinks they should behave, while making any discipline less likely for
officers who are favored by police departments. Importantly, how
police want their officers to police will likely diverge, sometimes
radically, from how the community wants them to behave.
An example should help illuminate the unreality of the presumed
promise of PDR transparency. When Officer Daniel Pantaleo choked
Eric Garner to death in 2015, Legal Aid attempted to gain access to his
records.164 New York courts denied access to these records.165 A
member of the CCRB in New York, however, leaked Pantaleo’s
record, and it became available for the public to see in March of 2017.166
The New York Times reported that the record was inconclusive, as
Pantaleo had a number of infractions, but not more than many other
officers in the NYPD.167 ThinkProgress, on the other hand, suggested
that Pantaleo’s record, including a substantiated charge for an
“abusive” stop and frisk, should have resulted in more disciplinary
action than he had received.168 These varying news reports and the
different experts they consulted suggest two things. First, it is unclear
that an examination of Pantaleo’s record would have warned anyone
that he might resort to a violent chokehold. Second, news outlets,
depending on the purpose of the articles they publish, will draw

and brown neighborhoods, proof that the NYPD’s accountability system responds remains critical
if we’re going to have true transparency and accountability”).
163. See,
e.g.,
CATO
INSTITUTE,
Transparency
in
Law
Enforcement,
POLICEMISCONDUCT.NET,
https://www.policemisconduct.net/explainers/transparency-in-lawenforcement [https://perma.cc/8VUD-EDVM] (explaining that in states that do not publicize
PDR’s, “[t]his lack of transparency manifests itself in . . . the public [being] unable to
discover . . . a [problematic] track record among the officers exercising power over them”).
164. See In re Luongo v. Records Access Officer, Civilian Complaint Review Bd., 51 N.Y.S.3d
46, 50 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017), motion for leave to appeal denied, 30 N.Y.3d 908 (2017).
165. See In re Luongo, 51 N.Y.S.3d at 57–58 (holding that a CCRB summary of police officer’s
record is exempt from disclosure under New York statute).
166. See Levine, We Need to Talk, supra note 26, at 1; Carimah Townes & Jack Jenkins,
Exclusive Documents: The Disturbing Secret History of the NYPD Officer Who Killed Eric
Garner, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 21, 2017, 2:09 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/daniel-pantaleorecords-75833e6168f3#.rrhh7jycp [https://perma.cc/M8P2-VAN9].
167. Al Baker & Benjamin Mueller, Records Leak in Eric Garner Case Renews Debate on
Police Discipline, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/22/nyregion/
nypd-eric-garner-daniel-pantaleo-disciplinary-records.html [https://perma.cc/RJJ2-QYGL].
168. Townes & Jenkins, supra note 166.
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conclusions that do little to helpfully inform the citizenry. Most
relevant here, however, the leak of this record has not led to Pantaleo’s
dismissal.169 He is still employed by the NYPD, which brought internal
charges against him this summer, after waiting for criminal
investigations to conclude.170 Those charges will surely be filed at some
point, but it is clear that whatever public pressure has been gained from
the leak of his internal file has not had any impact on the speed with
which the department will administer discipline. Moreover, using
Pantaleo as an example, it is difficult to understand how his personnel
file has any bearing on either public sentiment or the NYPD’s process.
He choked a man to death on video; if the outcry over this event does
not lead to the accountability that Legal Aid seeks, it is very hard to
imagine what releasing his record could add.
More broadly, even in states like Florida, where records are
public,171 officers who commit terrible abuses, even crimes, are often
not held accountable, at least not to the extent that many wish to see.
Florida’s experience suggests one major reason that PDR publication
may not have the impact its advocates desire—the internal disciplinary
process has multiple levels of appeal for officers accused of misconduct.
These appeal outcomes appear to greatly favor the accused officer.172
First of all, in Florida, as in many states, the ultimate decision about
discipline is left to the police chief. Even when she decides to terminate
or sanction an officer, however, the officer may appeal to an
arbitrator.173 A surprising number of officers terminated in Florida for
serious misconduct, or even criminal offenses, have been reinstated
after this appeals process.174 As discussed in Part I, transparency is
169. See Kashana Cauley, Opinion, Erica Garner and How America Destroys Black Families,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/opinion/erica-garner-blackfamilies.html [https://perma.cc/6A6A-VEQM] (“The Garner family continues to be disrespected.
Officer Pantaleo is still employed by the New York Police Department.”).
170. See Dale Eisinger & Nancy Dillon, Eric Garner’s Mother Calls on Local Officials to Push
Chokehold Cop Punishment: ‘We Still Should Get Justice’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 18, 2017),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/garner-mom-calls-officials-push-chokeholdpunishment-article-1.3504531 [https://perma.cc/8RUM-AEKP] (“[T]he NYPD and Mayor de
Blasio fail to act in deference to a seemingly stalled federal investigation.”).
171. See supra Part II.A.2.
172. See, e.g., David Ovalle, When Miami Fires Cops, They Usually Get Their Jobs Back –
Even if They’re Murder Suspects, MIAMI HERALD (June 10, 2017, 7:00 AM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article155412784.html
[https://perma.cc/K93CNH7E] (“Heard by state circuit judges, appeals are rarely successful because Florida law restricts
the reasons why an arbitration decision can be reversed.”).
173. Id.
174. See id. (noting that nine Miami police officers have been fired in the past three years, but

LEVINE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/24/2019 8:37 PM

876

[Vol. 68:839

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

simply not a solution in its own right for police abuse. Without
attacking the process for police discipline, advocates have little hope of
ensuring accountability through forced transparency.
Second, police solidarity is unusually high in comparison to other
occupations. But this solidarity often takes particular forms that are
antithetical to the goals of those who wish for police reform.175 Because
of this solidarity, it is not difficult to imagine anti-accountability
consequences arising from forced transparency.176 As discussed above,
whether or not to charge an officer with a given type of infraction is a
decision very often left to his or her supervisor.177 This decision to
charge may well be affected by a supervisor’s knowledge that the
discipline will not simply be seen by other members of the department
but by the entire public. Similarly, the final decision about internal
discipline is often left to the chief of police,178 and knowledge that the
that eight of them got their jobs back through arbitration); see also Kimbriell Kelly,
Wesley
Lowery
&
Steven
Rich,
Fired/Rehired,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
3,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/investigations/police-fired-rehired/
?utm_term=.e30d1189aa40 [https://perma.cc/5LB3-7C3C] (“Since 2006, the nation’s largest
police departments have fired at least 1,881 officers for misconduct that betrayed the public’s
trust, from cheating on overtime to unjustified shootings. . . . The Washington Post has found that
departments have been forced to reinstate more than 450 officers after appeals required by union
contracts.”); Jennifer Smith Richards & Jodi S. Cohen, Chicago Police Win Big When Appealing
Discipline, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 14, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/chicagopolice-grievances [https://perma.cc/XZ22-72EM] (“The investigation found that, of 314
disciplinary appeals the police union pursued [after officer discipline had been approved by
internal affairs] between February 2010 and February 2017, 266 led to favorable outcomes for
officers. Police had their punishments reduced or–in 58 of those cases–had them overturned
entirely.”).
175. See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453, 453–54 (2004) (“The cultural self-definition of policing is exemplified by such
terms of solidarity as the ‘brotherhood in blue’ and the ‘thin blue line.’”); Anthony C. Thompson,
Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 1009 (1999)
(noting that police have unusually high levels of organizational solidarity); cf. David Alan
Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense of the New Demographics of Law
Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1240 (2006) (noting that diversity in police
departments has started to weaken solidarity).
176. See Armacost, supra note 175, at 454 (noting that police are notorious for “circling the
wagons” when one of their own is accused of misconduct); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying:
Police Perjury and What To Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1055 (1996) (suggesting that
officers who out other officers for perjury should be rewarded significantly, given how much the
code of silence diminishes the likelihood of this happening).
177. See supra Part II.A.1.
178. See Ovalle, supra note 172 (noting that the final termination decision rests with the chief
of police but that arbitration can overturn this decision); Deitch v. City of N.Y. (In re Deitch),
No. 8707/09, 2009 WL 4263349, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 2009) (“The Committee unanimously
recommended to Chief of Personnel Pineiro that petitioner be terminated . . . . As stated above,
Chief Pineiro recommended petitioner’s termination on November 13, 2008. This was endorsed
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discipline will be public could affect her decision too. Making the
stakes of a sanction higher through publicity can also affect how other
officers determine whether or not to report infractions.179 Police are
already famous for circling the wagons, and the way that further PDRs
will impact this “code of silence” must be considered by those hoping
for police reform.180
As Barbara E. Armacost notes, however, police solidarity is a
double-edged sword: while the typical reaction to an accusation of
misconduct is for officers to close ranks behind the accused, “[i]f the
misconduct is found to be true . . . [officers’] departments deem the
miscreants ‘rogue cops’ whose conduct does not reflect negatively on
the organization from which they came.”181 In other words, if the police
find that they cannot deflect an officer’s misconduct, they single that
officer out rather than admit that his or her behavior is reflective of a
systemic cultural problem. Police brutality is, as anyone who has
watched recent events knows, an organizational problem.182 Police are
taught from the moment they enter the doors of the academy that they
must protect themselves at all costs,183 that they are facing constant
danger,184 that they must conform to the militaristic standards of the
department,185 and that they should carry with them an “us versus

by First Deputy Commissioner Grasso on November 20, 2008 and approved by Police
Commissioner Raymond V. Kelly on December 9, 2009 . . . .”), rev’d, 935 N.Y.S.2d 79 (2011).
179. As one author reports:
From the time he or she enters the police academy, a police cadet is introduced to the
concept that it is unacceptable to report the misconduct of other officers. The
ubiquitous nature of this code of silence in police culture and its impact on police
accountability is virtually undisputed. Several courts have even recognized the
existence of a code of silence within police culture, noting that the code of silence
facilitates police corruption and misconduct.
See Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police Accountability:
A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 382–83 (2010) (citations
omitted).
180. Id. at 383.
181. Armacost, supra note 175, at 454.
182. See Simmons, supra note 179, at 381 (“In recent years, police experts examining the
nature and causes of police misconduct have concluded that the roots of police misconduct rest
primarily within the organizational culture of policing.” (citation omitted)).
183. See id. at 382 (noting “the widespread belief among various levels and ranks
of police officers that some violence or brutality is a necessary part of effective policing” (citation
omitted)).
184. See, e.g., John P. Gross, Judge, Jury, and Executioner: The Excessive Use of Deadly Force
by Police Officers, 21 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 155, 179 (2016) (noting that “an overestimation of
the potential dangers facing law enforcement may . . . contribute to excessive use of deadly force
by police officers”).
185. The militaristic characteristics in American police departments are substantial:
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them” mentality. While a few incidents may indeed be the actions of
an officer gone “rogue,” most are merely an overreaction or extension
of the fear and power police are taught to carry with them every day.186
Police brutality is a complex, systemic problem that demands a
complex and systemic solution.187 Scapegoating “bad” officers by
outing them as having a “bad” record not only ignores the systemic
problems of police violence, but also allows police departments to
continue crafting the narrative that the department is a wellfunctioning organization with a few bad apples.188
This narrative is particularly problematic when one considers the
racial and other biases that pervade the policing profession.189 Indeed,
racial biases—so well documented by the ways police departments
police communities of color—are not left at the station house door.
Racism, nativism, and militaristic expectations of conformity are
features, not bugs, of policing that have been addressed by numerous
scholars. More practically, such issues have played out in hiring
decisions, termination decisions, and other employment issues.190 On
the racial front, there is evidence that black officers are disciplined

The military and police forces have a lot in common, including hierarchical
organization, a reliance on coercive techniques, and a professional dependence on
physical skill and strength. Nevertheless, their missions and the legal frameworks in
which they operate are distinct. Especially in the context of the “wars” on drugs and
terrorism, which have been largely funded by federal grants, American police
departments have been infused with military structure, culture, and techniques.
Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 927
(2015) (citations omitted).
186. Simmons, supra note 179, at 386.
187. See Armacost, supra note 175, at 456 (arguing that scapegoating leads to fewer questions
about how “the officer came to be in that particular situation in the first place and whether there
is anything to be learned by examining the organizational norms and policies that framed his
judgment” (citation omitted)).
188. As one author explains:
The officer-gone-bad explanation . . . assumes that the misbehaving cop is off on a
‘frolic and detour’ for which he alone is accountable. This explanation allows the
department to distance itself from incidents of misconduct by labeling the perpetrators
“rogue cops,” deviants who are wholly unlike their fellow officers. Moreover, it allows
police leadership to declare to the rest of the rank and file, “this incident is not about
you.”
Id.
189. See Sklansky, supra note 85, at 1826 (“Affirmative action programs succeeded in opening
the doors of police departments to large numbers of Blacks, Latinos, and women. But it failed,
often, at fully integrating them into the social fabric of those departments.”).
190. See Armacost, supra note 175, at 493 (“Law enforcement organizations have cultures –
commonly held norms, social practices, expectations, and assumptions – that encourage or
discourage certain values, goals, and behaviors.”).
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more often and more harshly than their white counterparts.191
Numerous lawsuits have been filed by nonwhite officers alleging that
their careers have been negatively impacted due to racial bias in their
departments.192 And this may be a particular problem for those who
want PDR transparency to enforce accountability. The same black
officers who are disciplined more regularly are also the most likely to
welcome community input and reform suggestions.193 In fact, black
officers who protest police brutality may face internal discipline.194
And, these officers, worried about their disciplinary records, are
unlikely to protest abuses that they see for fear of retaliation. Sergeant
McFadden makes this point, saying, “If I’m retaliated against as an
officer, and it goes unchecked . . . of course I’m not going to complain
about citizens getting mistreated.”195 Making PDRs public may serve
to magnify the racial biases that are already impacting officers of color.
Bias does not stop at race in police departments; it also affects
officers who do not conform to the dominant culture of departments.196
As discussed above, this can lead to discipline of officers who do not
police in a biased manner.197 It also applies to officers who question the
wisdom of supervisors, call out other officers for bad behavior, and
generally object to the command structure. If PDRs reflect cultural
biases as much as they reflect actual disciplinary problems, records may

191. See, e.g., Tanveer Ali, Black Officers Twice as Likely To Be Punished by CPD: Data,
DNAINFO (Nov. 10, 2015, 8:57 AM), https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20151110/bronzeville/
repeat-excessive-force-offenders-within-cpd-rarely-punished-data-shows [https://perma.cc/
VAH6-S7SJ] (“Black officers are disproportionately found guilty of offenses and suffer higher
punishments. Black officers with sustained findings are punished more than twice as often as
white officers.”).
192. See, e.g., Elicia Dover, Black Police Officers Association Sends Complaint Letter Against
Chief Buckner, KATV (July 6, 2017), http://katv.com/news/local/black-police-officersassociation-send-complaint-letter-against-chief-buckner [https://perma.cc/3AX9-A3V2] (stating
that the complaint included allegations of discrimination in promotion, transfers, and discipline).
193. See Sklansky, supra note 85, at 1827 (“Organizations representing Black officers . . . have
often parted company with older, more established police unions in welcoming civilian
review, . . . lobbying for restrictions on racial profiling, . . . supporting the reimposition of
residency requirements, and more generally . . . calling on police departments to pay more
attention to the needs and interests of minority residents.” (citation omitted)).
194. See supra note 3.
195. Joseph, supra note 118.
196. See Sklansky, supra note 85, at 1826 (“[P]atterns of friendship and informal networks of
mentoring and trust have broken down along lines of race and gender. Similar . . . divides have
emerged between openly gay officers and officers who, for religious or other reasons, are
uncomfortable around gays or who suspect that gays have received preferential treatment in
promotions.” (citation omitted)).
197. See supra Part II.A.1.
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well fail to flag officers whose problems are those that advocates for
police accountability worry about; rather, PDRs are more likely to
document problems that police supervisors worry about—problems
that likely do not necessarily align.
Thus, for numerous reasons, forced PDR transparency may not
lead to the accountability its proponents seek. Furthermore, it may
actually impede both inquiry into organizational problems and efforts
by minority officers to verbalize their reform-minded critiques of the
departments for which they work. Moreover, as addressed next, the
race and bias problems that pervade police discipline are distinctly
similar to the race and bias problems that pervade the criminal justice
system more generally. A PDR may reflect racism and scapegoating
much like a criminal record often does. Real systemic criminal justice
and police reform must take account of these similarities.
III. POLICE RECORDS AS CRIMINAL RECORDS
Anyone serious about criminal justice reform should take police
seriously when they advocate for their rights for two reasons. First, the
connection between police under investigation and ordinary criminal
defendants is actually quite powerful. And second, the police are
criminal justice insiders who set and enforce criminal law and policy;
they know what rights an individual needs to protect herself from
investigation. Here, we see the police using their special knowledge to
retain a semblance of privacy in a world all too comfortable with
stripping it.198 The pushback from police officers against the
publication of PDRs is no exception. While, at first blush, the
disciplinary record of a police officer may seem entirely different from
a civilian’s criminal record, deeper inquiry reveals numerous critical
similarities.
This Part argues that the debate over PDRs mirrors and amplifies
the debate over the publication of criminal records—a debate that has
decidedly been won by those favoring transparency.199 Scholars and
advocates for criminal defendants have lamented for decades the

198. See Levine, Police Suspects, supra note 22, at 1208–09 (“Police are the central players in
this group of unchecked insiders who control power and knowledge in the criminal justice
system. . . . [T]hose with knowledge and control will, without checks, do everything they can to
maintain their favored status . . . .” (citations omitted)).
199. See JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 1 (2015) (noting that “federal
and state criminal record repositories contain criminal records for approximately 25 percent of
the U.S. adult population” (citation omitted)).
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myriad ways in which criminal record publication affects the lives of
those convicted of crimes,200 while police and law enforcement groups
have maintained the importance of transparency for the safety of the
public, among other things.201 However, when it comes to PDRs, the
sides are reversed—criminal defense advocates insist that PDRs should
be public, while the police maintain that such publication would be
harmful to officers and not helpful to the public.202 This Part shows how
the debate over PDRs sounds very much like a debate over the
publication of criminal records. It then details the harms that each type
of informational transparency may occasion, including false
allegations, due process problems, arbitrary and inaccurate records
becoming public, the institutional incompetence of the public in
reading such records, and the lifelong reputational stains that may
accompany disclosures. This Part concludes that the debate over PDR
transparency adds a new dimension to the ongoing scholarly and policy
debate over the publication of criminal records and suggests that the
resolution of the PDR debate has implications for the future of
criminal record publication and its regulation.

200. See, e.g., Dallan F. Flake, When Any Sentence Is a Life Sentence: Employment
Discrimination Against Ex-Offenders, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 45, 47 (2015) (noting obstacles to
employment for those with a criminal record); James B. Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding
Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 177–78
(2008) (arguing that wide-ranging use of criminal records is a result unmoored from original
intent); Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN.
L. REV. 541, 542 (2016) (explaining the problems with inaccurate databases); Michael
Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 501 (2010) (documenting the disproportionate impact of criminal records
on people of color, and comparing the American criminal record regime to that of other
countries). See generally Joy Radice, The Reintegrative State, 66 EMORY L.J. 1315 (2017)
(explaining the need for integrated criminal record reform).
201. See, e.g., Alison Knezevich, New State Laws To Help Marylanders Clear Arrest Records,
BALT. SUN (Sept. 26, 2015, 11:02 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bs-mdexpungement-changes-20150926-story.html [https://perma.cc/UPZ2-9USC]. The article quotes
several people opposed to legislation that would help individuals clear their arrest records. One
interviewee, a retired police sergeant, said that “the . . . law went too far.” Id. The sergeant added,
“It goes to character, whether you can trust that person . . . . My concern is that people are going
to be trusting people [when] they really don’t know their full background.” Id. A lobbyist for the
Maryland Chamber of Commerce, which also opposed the legislation, said that “businesses
should be able to gather as much information about prospective employees as possible for liability
and safety reasons.” Id.
202. See infra Part III.A.
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A. The Rhetoric Surrounding PDR Transparency Reveals Important
Similarities Between Police Records and Criminal Records
A very interesting phenomenon occurs when one studies the
statements of law enforcement advocates who are concerned about the
privacy of PDRs and the statements of those who believe officer PDRs
should be public. The debate sounds remarkably similar to the debate
over criminal records. Law enforcement officers and officials worry
about PDR publication along many of the same axes as criminal
defense advocates who raise concerns about criminal record
transparency: false allegations, due process rights, arbitrary and
inaccurate records becoming public, the institutional incompetence of
the public to read such records, and the lifelong reputational harms
that may come with disclosure.203
Meanwhile, those advocating the publication of PDRs—many of
whom work for organizations that also advocate for the rights of
criminal defendants—deploy similar rhetoric to those who would
justify the current state of publication for criminal records and for
harsh criminal justice policies more generally.204 They appeal to public
safety, tell stories of victimization to illustrate the danger of
nonpublication, and suggest that public PDRs are necessary to rid
society of rogue or “bad” officers. Putting both strands of rhetoric
together helps crystalize the need for careful parsing of publication
policies surrounding both police and civilian records.
1. Law Enforcement Rhetoric. Law enforcement advocates who
denounce the publication of PDRs make a number of rhetorical moves
that echo scholarly critiques of the publication of criminal records.
Indeed, when police advocates defend their right to privacy, they
sometimes make the comparison to criminal defendants explicit. For
example, a California district attorney referred to “police officer
privacy rights under sunshine legislation as less than the privacy rights
of ‘murderers, pedophiles, and other criminals.’”205 He made the
comparison even more clear when he defended police privacy by
claiming that legislators should not bring the “privacy rights of ‘good’
guys (police officers) down to the same level of ‘bad’ guys (criminal
defendants).”206 Police unions also compare their concerns about false
203.
204.
205.
206.

See infra notes 204–24 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 226–45 and accompanying text.
Bies, supra note 12, at 141 (citation omitted).
Id. at 141–42.
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allegations against police officers to the fate of wrongly accused
citizens. In a statement to the Los Angeles Times regarding a California
lawsuit about disclosure of police misconduct, a union representative
said, “[N]obody wants to be wrongly accused of anything. That applies
to everyone else in the world, so it should apply to [police officers]
too.”207
Beyond the explicit comparisons, police advocates fear the same
bad outcomes from the publication of PDRs as those that plague the
formerly incarcerated.208 One major concern is that false charges may
be filed against an officer. In New York, where advocacy groups have
been fighting to make police misconduct public, the president of the
Albany Police Officers Union defended the secrecy of disciplinary
records, saying that “the law helps shield officers from having
‘unfounded allegations’ against them from being made public.” He
explained that “[i]nvestigations are allegations,” and that “[i]t is an
allegation until there is an outcome.”209 Darrell Stephens, an expert on
police discipline, has noted that this is a continual concern for officers:
“They are concerned that unsubstantiated misconduct allegations could
damage their reputations and careers if open to the public.”210 A police
advocate made this concern clear when he stated, “[W]e shouldn’t be
painting someone before all the information has come out. A lot of
these things turn out to be not sustained or unfounded.”211
There is also a fear that civilians will concoct allegations against
officers to minimize the consequences in their own cases. Law
enforcement advocates “point out that officers are sometimes the
subject of false allegations made by people trying to get back at them
simply for doing their job.”212 An attorney who represents officers in
misconduct allegations noted that “people often make up complaints to
back officers off of investigations or to try to prevent them from
207. Maya Lau, A Court is Blocking L.A. County Sheriff from Handing Over a List of 300
Problem Deputies, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/
la-me-sheriff-deputies-misconduct-list-20170219-story.html [https://perma.cc/PB9P-4BA5].
208. See infra Part III.B.
209. Dartunorro Clark, State Law Keeps Police Files Shrouded in Secrecy, TIMES UNION
(Mar. 15, 2015, 8:53 AM), http://www.timesunion.com/tuplus-local/article/State-law-keepspolice-files-shrouded-in-secrecy-6134788.php [https://perma.cc/62GU-GPHK].
210. Stephens, supra note 106, at 8–9.
211. Jim Miller, California Has Tightest Restrictions on Law-Enforcement Records, Access
Advocates Say, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 17, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/
politics-government/article2593232.html [https://perma.cc/R9FW-5T3J]. This sentiment is echoed
by police advocates in New York. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
212. Stephens, supra note 106, at 9.
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testifying. And there is no consequence for making a false
complaint.”213 The fear of unjust or unfounded allegations is not just
from civilians, but also from internal department complaints: “[E]ven
[charges] by internal affairs[] are not conclusive and false claims are
often made . . . .”214
Police officers and their advocates are also concerned about the
due process rights of officers. This is both because of false or
unprovable complaints and because of more general process worries.
Officers argue that they are “entitled to due process through the Police
Department’s internal disciplinary process. Officers who face charges
are offered punishment or can fight the charges through a trial board,
a three-member panel of fellow officers and commanders.”215 Police
advocates also specifically equate “officers who prevail before a trial
board to criminal defendants who are acquitted by a jury.”216 The
president of the Albany Police Officers Union argues that privacy
serves the crucial purpose of shielding officers from being judged in
public before charges against them have been sustained by the internal
disciplinary process: “Investigations are allegations . . . until there is an
outcome.”217
Police advocates also argue that officers already incur punishment
for their bad actions and should not face further scrutiny in the press.
They explain that “rule-breaking officers already face tough
investigations from within their own departments, as well as possible
federal inquiries. There is no need to inject the public into the
process . . . .”218 In other words, police advocates believe that the
internal process is already difficult enough for officers, without
splashing their results in public: “If the point is to hold officers
accountable, there’s a process that weighs the right and the need to that
information to the protection of their rights. You don’t need to carte
blanche release them.”219
213. Justin Fenton, Attorneys for 20 Defendants Seek Release of City Police Officer’s
Personnel File, BALT. SUN (Mar. 9, 2017, 7:33 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/
crime/bs-md-ci-donato-file-20170309-story.html [https://perma.cc/3ESH-9TP4] (quotation marks
omitted).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Clark, supra note 209.
218. Jim Miller, California Has Tightest Restrictions on Law-Enforcement Records, Access
Advocates Say, MODESTO BEE (Mar. 17, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.modbee.com/news/state/
article3162015.html#storylink=cpy [https://perma.cc/K82R-W66M].
219. Gene Maddaus, Should Misbehaving Cops Be Shielded from Public Scrutiny?, L.A.
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Another concern for police and their advocates is the damage that
release of disciplinary records might do to an officer’s reputation.220
Defending police privacy more generally, Rick Weisman, director of
labor services at the National Fraternal Order of Police, made clear
that “[o]ur job isn’t to keep bad officers in this profession. Our job is
to make sure that due process is given to the officers . . . .”221 They
believe that the media wants access to records, not for accountability,
but for “shock and awe . . . salacious things.”222 There is fear that
“[t]ransparency equates to more sensationalism and higher sales for
the [media]. It does not equate to developing public trust.”223 Opposing
a bill to make internal disciplinary hearings public, Rusty Hicks, the
head of the L.A. County Federation of Labor, wrote that “[h]olding
these hearings in public will open the door to creating a media and
public circus, and will not further the cause of justice.”224 In Maryland,
the Fraternal Order of Police argued against an assembly bill to make
PDRs more public, claiming that “disclosure of records of misconduct
would lead to public embarrassment of the officers.”225
The concern appears to be not only that the media will
sensationalize misconduct, but also that releasing officer disciplinary
information without context could lead to unfair judgments about an
officer’s reputation. One specific reputational concern is that an old
allegation or sustained charge of misconduct might besmirch the
reputation of an otherwise good officer. Union representatives voice
concern that “disclosure would . . . draw unfair scrutiny on deputies
whose mistakes might have happened long ago.”226
A related concern is that minor charges might stigmatize
otherwise good officers. There is concern that disclosure could bring a
“negative stigma” to an individual officer, no matter how minor the

WKLY. (Apr. 18, 2016, 6:30 AM), http://www.laweekly.com/news/should-misbehaving-cops-beshielded-from-public-scrutiny-6832927 [https://perma.cc/2AAM-Y7LC].
220. See Stephens, supra note 106, at 8–9 (“They are concerned that unsubstantiated
misconduct allegations could damage their reputations and careers if open to the public.”).
221. Reade Levinson, Across the U.S., Police Contracts Shield Officers from Scrutiny and
Discipline, REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2017, 1:18 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/usa-police-unions [https://perma.cc/HKC8-6F3V].
222. Maddaus, supra note 219.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. David A. Plymyer, Shining a Light on Police Misconduct, BALT. SUN (Jan. 19, 2016, 1:39
PM),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-police-transparency-20160119story.html [https://perma.cc/57TX-MVFP].
226. Lau, supra note 207.
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violation.227 An attorney for one police group made the argument very
plain, citing an example of an officer with an “otherwise spotless
reputation” who was found to have “fibbed about what time he came
into work one morning.”228 Arguing that this officer should not face the
stigma of publicized misconduct, he said, “We shouldn’t try to cut off
their heads for the rest of their lives . . . .”229
In sum, police advocates are concerned about false allegations,
due process rights, reputational harm, unfair stigma, and the
institutional competence of the public to read PDRs in the correct
context. These arguments mirror the way scholars and advocates
discuss the problems with the widespread publication of criminal
records.230 If we are to take one group seriously, it follows we should
also respect the privacy concerns of the other group. This is especially
true because criminal record publication verifies that police privacy
concerns are legitimate. Still, those who often advocate in favor of
criminal defendants sound just like “law and order” politicians or
victim’s rights groups when they talk about PDRs.
2. PDR-Transparency Rhetoric. Advocates for publicizing PDRs
appeal to issues of public safety, personal accountability, and ensuring
that bad police officers are no longer employed; each category is easily
analogous to arguments about criminal record publication. Indeed,
PDR-transparency advocates use rhetoric to describe the police that is
strikingly similar to the way law enforcement groups talk about the
dangers posed by people with criminal convictions.231
Sometimes the comparison between criminal records and PDRs is
made explicitly. The New York Civil Liberties Union, in its brief on
behalf of those who wished to make Officer Pantaleo’s record public,
laid bare the aptness of the comparison. The brief rightly noted the
unfairness that Pantaleo’s record remained private, while “a quick
Google search reveals an extensive detailing of Eric Garner’s history

227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See generally Levin, supra note 20.
231. Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to
Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 135 n.122 (2007) (explaining that among
law enforcement, policy makers, and the public, “the public’s right to know trumps the right to
privacy, and the stigma of a criminal record is generally viewed as deserved punishment”).
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with the criminal justice system.”232 The brief contended that “[t]here
cannot be true accountability when publicly-available information is so
one-sided.”233 Yet, rather than focusing on the problem with public
access to Garner’s record, the brief focused on treating Pantaleo’s
privacy with a similar disregard. More generally, advocates disregard
arguments that the police have a privacy interest in the process and
result of disciplinary actions because the accused officers have “broken
the law. They’ve breached their trust with the public, and they
shouldn’t have this cloak of confidentiality.”234
Less explicitly, advocates allege a number of reasons that PDRs
should be made public. First, they argue that the privacy interests of
individual officers must be outweighed by “the immense interest of the
citizenry to have access to information about the men and women
policing their communities.”235 Even if individual officers have a
privacy interest, advocates argue that “there is also a public interest in
identifying officers who go beyond the standards of accepted police
conduct.”236 This “immense” interest is put in the direst terms: the
publication of PDRs is literally a matter of life and death. A California
bill was touted as a path to “potentially life-saving information to
citizens.”237
To powerfully bring home this notion of life or death, advocates
tell stirring stories of victims of police brutality, underscoring the
importance of publicizing PDRs. However, advocacy often fails to
explain how such publication could have aided these victims. Testifying
in favor of legislation aimed at making certain PDRs public in
California, a supporter of the bill shared the story of the killing of a
young, unarmed black man.238 She went on to tell the legislature that
on the day the young man was killed, her own one-year-old daughter
and four-year-old nephew witnessed the killing.239 She then stated, “We
must pass the bill, because we are fighting for a day when . . . California
232. Brief of Amici Curiae Communities United for Police Reform and 33 Organizations in
Support of Petitioner-Respondent at 7, Luongo v. Records Access Officer, Civilian Complaint
Review Bd., 51 N.Y.S.3d 46 (2017) (No. 100250/2015).
233. Id.
234. Maddaus, supra note 219.
235. CATO INSTITUTE, supra note 163.
236. Miller, supra note 218.
237. David Greenwald, Commentary: SB 1286 Would Provide Transparency to Police
Complaints, DAVIS VANGUARD (May 26, 2016), http://www.davisvanguard.org/2016/05/
commentary-sb-1286-provide-transparency-police-complaints [https://perma.cc/L7J6-EZFB].
238. Id.
239. See id.
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will not lead the nation in police shootings, for a day when ‘to protect
and serve’ doesn’t mean to protect property and serve the rich.”240
Regardless of the horror of the story or the salience of her plea, the
connection between public PDRs and justice for young men of color
remains nebulous.241
According to advocates, public safety depends on police
departments ridding themselves of “bad” or rogue officers: “Police
should focus on rooting out officers guilty of egregious conduct.
Opening disciplinary records would help make this happen.”242 In
California, advocates allege that “officers with serious misconduct
records that should have disqualified them from duty have gone on to
harm city residents.”243 And advocates warn that “[u]nder current law,
the public can’t know who are the rogue officers, and it can’t assess
whether law enforcement is disciplining them or firing them when
serious misconduct persists.”244 According to the American Civil
Liberties Union, if PDRs are public, “the media and the community
can tell when a particular officer is responsible for a string of shootings
or when a department seems not to notice that the same officers are
shooting again and again.”245 Advocates also see the threat of
publication as a deterrent to bad behavior by officers, noting that the
threat “sends a powerful message to officers on the streets: If you
commit misconduct, you are certain to face punishment, and the public
will learn about it.”246
Advocates for the publication of PDRs argue using terms like
public safety, victimization, “bad” officers whose rogue conduct must
be curtailed, and the deterrent effect of public shaming. As the rest of
this Part develops, these are very similar to the arguments made by
advocates of criminal record publication; those with a criminal
conviction are dangers to public safety, threats to the innocent, and
240. Id.
241. See supra Part II.C.
242. Susan Sward, Opinion, Open Police Disciplinary Records, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 8,
2015,
5:01
PM),
http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/california-forum/article30010635.html
[https://perma.cc/4MHD-YVTC].
243. New Legislation Increases Transparency in Law Enforcement Records, AM. CIV.
LIBERTIES UNION N. CAL. (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.aclunc.org/news/new-legislationincreases-transparency-law-enforcement-records [https://perma.cc/4ARG-SMA9].
244. Sward, supra note 242.
245. Peter Bibring, California Supreme Court Rules for Police Transparency, AM. CIV.
LIBERTIES UNION S. CAL. (May 29, 2014), https://www.aclusocal.org/en/news/californiasupreme-court-rules-police-transparency [https://perma.cc/95L9-E6LP].
246. Sward, supra note 242.
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abnormal criminals who must be outed and deterred by a permanent
public stain. These arguments have led to a publicness of criminal
records that most agree has improperly tipped the balance from
privacy to transparency for criminal defendants who have already paid
their debt to society through punishment.
B. The Lived Experience of Those with Criminal Convictions
The publication of PDRs and the ensuing debate over
transparency and privacy for police do not arise in a vacuum. In fact,
there is a long-studied and well-trodden area of scholarship and law
addressing a very similar privacy-transparency problem—the
publication of criminal records.247 Unlike the police, who are well
protected by their unions and legislators, criminal defendants and the
formerly incarcerated have long suffered the fate of record
publication.248 The statistics and scholarship demonstrating the very
real consequences of criminal record publication lend credence to the
rhetorical fears of law enforcement advocates and raise concerns that
law enforcement either does not realize or is not concerned about—
most importantly, the connection between discipline and racial bias. At
the same time, law enforcement advocates’ demands for their privacy
shines a new and important light on why we must reform our policy on
the publication of criminal records, with particular emphasis on
concerns related to due process, inaccuracy, racial bias, and
reputational stain. While the use of criminal records has been
questioned by scholars in numerous contexts,249 this Section focuses on
the dissemination of criminal records and their use by the public
because that is the direct concern of PDR privacy.
A criminal record, known colloquially as a rap sheet, “is a lifetime
record of an individual’s arrests and, ideally, charges, dispositions, and
sentences resulting from those arrests.”250 Every state has a criminal

247. See generally, e.g., Marc A. Franklin & Diane Johnsen, Expunging Criminal Records:
Concealment and Dishonesty in an Open Society, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 733 (1981) (noting
availability of criminal records); JACOBS, supra note 199 (same); Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 200
(same); Kevin Lapp, American Criminal Record Exceptionalism, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 303
(2016); Logan & Ferguson, supra note 200 (same); Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap
Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 321 (2015) (same).
248. JACOBS, supra note 199, at 1 (same).
249. See, e.g., Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 563
(2014) (critiquing “impeachment of criminal defendants by means of their prior criminal
convictions”).
250. JACOBS, supra note 199, at 33.
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record repository, and as of 2012, over 100 million people in the United
States have a criminal record.251 Originally created for use by law
enforcement agencies, rap sheets are now made available for a myriad
of purposes252 such as housing, welfare, and employment. Moreover,
“[c]riminal background checking is a booming business.”253 There are
“hundreds, maybe even thousands” of companies who conduct
criminal record searches for a fee.254 These businesses even have their
own trade union, the National Association of Professional Background
Screeners, which claims to have 700 members.255
Scholars have been arguing for years that mass publication of
criminal records brands the those who have contact with the criminal
justice system with a lifelong stain. Their arguments have been borne
out by studies256 and have led to serious discussion over reforming the
current criminal record regime.257 This Section shows the similarities
between the fears police claim about publication of their PDRs and the
reality of those fears as applied to the formerly incarcerated. While the
stain of a criminal record goes far beyond concerns facing police, this
Article focuses on issues that are legitimately applicable to both,
including problems of inaccuracy, discrimination and arbitrariness,
misreading by an institutionally incompetent public, and permanent
reputational harm from old or minor charges or convictions. This
comparison suggests two things: we should not reflexively dismiss the
concerns of rank-and-file police officers, and we should use such
concerns to bolster the reform proposals aimed at undoing some of the
damage wrought on people with criminal records.

251. Id. at 37–38.
252. Id. at 46.
253. Id. at 70.
254. Id. at 71.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 150.
257. There are numerous proposals for reform. Among the most widely known is “ban the
box,” which prevents employers from checking an applicant’s criminal record in the first rounds
of interviews. Over 150 cities have adopted this reform. See generally BETH AVERY & PHIL
HERNANDEZ, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, BAN THE BOX: U.S. CITIES, COUNTIES, AND STATES
ADOPT FAIR-CHANCE HIRING POLICIES TO ADVANCE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR
PEOPLE WITH PAST CONVICTIONS (Sept. 2018), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Banthe-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide-September.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N69J-PVNA]
(documenting state and local initiatives preventing employers from checking candidates criminal
records).
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There are numerous ways criminal records are used. First, they are
used in proceedings for impeachment and sentencing purposes.258
Second, they are used by law enforcement agencies to investigate,
surveil, and locate potential wrongdoers.259 Third, they are used by
state agencies to deny certain benefits, like food stamps and housing.260
And finally, they are used by the public, who can pay for or simply look
up criminal record information, whether for employment purposes, for
newspaper articles, or for any other reason. While scholars have
critiqued the use of records in each of these settings, the focus here is
on this last—most attenuated and least justifiable—use of criminal
records.261
Criminal record publication reinforces societal stratification along
racial lines by denying far more people of color the benefits of a “crime
free” life than their white counterparts. This exacerbates an already
racially-problematic employment system. Discrimination against those
with criminal records is well recorded,262 as is discrimination against
people of color who have no criminal record.263 It follows that if a
disproportionate number of people of color have criminal records,
their employment chances will be doubly hurt by their race and their
records.264

258. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 249.
259. See, e.g., James B. Jacobs & Dimitra Blitsa, Sharing Criminal Records: The United States,
the European Union and Interpol Compared, 30 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 125, 131 (2008)
(“[A]ny police officer with access to a laptop computer can use the [FBI’s records database] to
find out within minutes whether the person he has just stopped/arrested has a
prior criminal record or is wanted anywhere in the United States.”).
260. See Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 826 (2015) (looking at the
“role that arrest information plays in immigration enforcement and public housing” and
“regulatory decisions: public employment, licensing, foster care, social services, and education”).
261. Id. at 816 (“In the criminal justice context, criminal procedure provides important
constraints on how [records] ought to be used and processed. But similar constraints do not
operate outside of the criminal justice context, leaving the possibility that manifestly unfair,
unlawful, or otherwise undesirable [records] may have serious consequences.” (citation omitted)).
262. Lapp, supra note 247, at 311 (“Public criminal records also enable discretionary
discrimination. Employers, landlords, and colleges conduct background checks and make
unfavorable decisions based on criminal records.” (citation omitted)).
263. JACOBS, supra note 199, at 280 (describing a field experiment in which a white applicant
with no criminal record received more positive interest from employers than an African American
applicant with no criminal record).
264. Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 963, 973 (2013) (“Regardless of the sentence served, individuals of color, particularly
African-American men, have become essentially unemployable, largely because of their criminal
records.”).
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The problem of discrimination is compounded by the fact that
those not familiar with criminal records do not have the institutional
competence to accurately or rationally assess charges and
convictions.265 In the criminal record context, this plays out most
dramatically with employment. Employers, colleges, landlords,
volunteer organizations, and licensing agencies routinely run criminal
background checks.266 Criminal records, originally intended for use by
law enforcement, are now “more often used to provide criminal
biographies for non-criminal justice purposes.”267 While, theoretically,
law enforcement officers should be able to read and understand a rap
sheet, the same cannot be said of non-criminal justice actors, such as
employers.268 Even if an employer is not bent on discriminating against
anyone with a criminal record, she is likely to overestimate the risk or
liability posed by a given charge. Furthermore, because charges and
dispositions are often listed more than once on a rap sheet, and because
of other problems of “overlap[],” there is an increased chance that
someone without the training to read them will “interpret [a] rap sheet
as more serious than it really is.”269 No work has been done to assess
the risk posed by a person with a prior conviction for a particular job,
and indeed, it is possible, as James B. Jacobs claims, that there is “no
science for assessing” such a risk.270
There is, however, vast research to show that recidivism
dramatically decreases with age.271 Yet, because employers and other
non-criminal-justice actors are likely not familiar with the
phenomenon of “aging out” of criminality, they may not put infractions
committed years before in their rational place. Nor are those
unfamiliar with criminal law likely to know how to differentiate
between major and minor crimes. For instance, a low-level felony may
carry a year in prison, be nonviolent, and have caused no harm to
265. JACOBS, supra note 199, at 47 (“While police are accustomed to reading and interpreting
rap sheets, the same is not true of many non-law enforcement users.”).
266. Danielle R. Jones, When the Fallout of a Criminal Conviction Goes Too Far: Challenging
Collateral Consequences, 11 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 237, 249 n.75 (2015); Lapp, supra note 247, at
321.
267. JACOBS, supra note 199, at 46.
268. Id. at 47.
269. Id. at 47–48.
270. Id. at 264.
271. Lapp, supra note 247, at 315 (“It has consistently been found that . . . the prevalence of
offending tends to increase in early adolescence, rise to a peak in late adolescence, and diminish
in early adulthood. . . . [A] lot of people commit crimes in their teens and early twenties, and most
of them stop . . . as they age.” (citation omitted)).
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anyone else. Yet, it is hard to imagine many employers distinguishing
between an A felony (the most severe) and an E felony (a far less
severe conviction). Moreover, to read a criminal record correctly, an
employer should concentrate on crimes that might impact a person’s
ability to work in that particular industry. While it may be relevant to
a financial institution, for instance, that a person has financial crimes
on her record, it is far less relevant if the person has an arrest or
conviction for drug use.272 But it is not apparent that employers weigh
such fine gradations when making hiring decisions.273 Criminal records,
no matter their contents or the accuracy of the dispositions contained
therein, lead understandably risk-averse employers to refuse to hire
millions of individuals.274
Another major issue with public access to criminal records is
inaccuracy, particularly in the form the public sees them. This problem
can be broken down even further into inaccuracy that violates a
defendant’s due process rights—that is, arrests and charges that are
never erased despite a dismissal or acquittal—convictions that are
wrongly attributed, and convictions that have been legally expunged
but not erased.275 Each state has its own repository for criminal records,
the FBI maintains a national record, and as discussed above, private
firms maintain their own data. One clear issue is how to correct
thousands of different databases. But inaccuracies are rife even in the
databases controlled by the government. For instance, while a rap
sheet should contain all information after a defendant is arrested and
charged, it is often true that dispositions of the case, including

272. But see EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 753 (S.D. Fla. 1989)
(upholding a lifetime employment ban for anyone convicted of theft crimes).
273. See Jones, supra note 266, at 249 (suggesting that the notion that employers should have
“law-abiding workers” paints a “daunting picture” for anyone with a criminal record who is
attempting to gain work).
274. See id. (reasoning that because background checks might lead to workplace safety,
employers are interested in the backgrounds of job applicants).
275. Inaccuracies in criminal records are multifarious, serious, and wildly prevalent:
One recent study found that fifty percent of FBI rap sheets are incomplete or
inaccurate. Some records contain multiple entries for the same arrest or conviction,
giving an exaggerated impression of criminality. Others attribute criminal history
information to the wrong people. Many do not include updated arrest and court
dispositions, and records that were supposed to be sealed or expunged remain fully
accessible. Each kind of error produces outcomes at odds with the goals of public
criminal records, such as wrongly denied jobs and education, and unwarranted arrests.
Lapp, supra note 247, at 307–08 (citations omitted); see also Logan & Ferguson, supra note 200,
at 567 (citing “many instances where record identities of individuals were conflated when court
records attributed a case to the wrong person, thereby merging their histories” (citation and
quotations omitted)).
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acquittals and dismissals, either never get reported or get reported late
due to bureaucratic delay.276 Sometimes the same arrest or conviction
is entered multiple times on one person’s rap sheet. Rap sheets may
also contain information attributed to the wrong person.277 Indeed, the
National Employment Law Project estimates that as many as 50
percent of criminal records contain errors.278
These errors run counter to the larger goals of public criminal
records. As Kevin Lapp notes, “Each kind of error produces outcomes
at odds with the goals of public criminal records, such as wrongly
denied jobs and education, and unwarranted arrests.”279 Even if a
person discovers these errors on her criminal record, it takes time,
money, and know-how to fix them.280 Often an individual only
discovers mistakes on her rap sheet once an employer has already
refused to hire her, when the damage has already been done.281 In
addition, even when a particular conviction or charge is authorized for
expungement—that is, erasure from a person’s rap sheet—such
erasure is not automatic. In fact, it is the person with the criminal
record who must initiate the long, frustrating, bureaucratic process of
removing a disposition that legally no longer belongs on her record.282
One obvious response to the problem of inaccuracy is that it is not
a reason to make rap sheets less public, but rather inaccuracies should
encourage fixing the system that distributes them. Regardless of
whether or not such a fix is feasible, even a completely accurate rap
sheet reflects only a partial and very problematic story about a person’s
life, especially once set in the context of our criminal justice system.
Criminal records are necessarily underinclusive in that many more
people have committed crimes than are accounted for by the criminal
justice system.283 For example, only a small percentage of drug users

276. JACOBS, supra note 199, at 38 (noting that prosecutors and judges do not send in
information that they have at their disposal, and that even when they do, bureaucratic delays and
error lead to permanent inaccuracies).
277. Lapp, supra note 247, at 309.
278. JACOBS, supra note 199, at 135.
279. Lapp, supra note 247, at 309.
280. Id. at 314.
281. Id.
282. Id. (noting that the individual with a criminal record must “initiate the process” to get a
disposition expunged and that that process “can be needlessly difficult and costly”).
283. Id. at 312 (“A major problem with affixing such punitive consequences to criminal
records (beyond their inaccuracies) is that criminal records are unavoidably underinclusive as
marker[s]. While a record of a conviction typically means the person committed the alleged
offense, actual crime far exceeds reported crime, and reported crime far exceeds convictions.”
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are arrested. Thus, only those citizens bear the permanent stain of
“drug user,” losing housing, employment, and other societal
opportunities; many other drug users suffer no such consequences.284
Making matters worse, of course, is the racially discriminatory nature
of arrests, incarceration, and criminal records.285
Finally, a criminal record is not just a temporary consequence of a
criminal conviction. It is a permanent stain, one which a number of
scholars credibly argue leads to “civil death.”286 The reputational
consequences of a record dog those with convictions for their entire
lives. The wide dissemination of and easy access to these records
ensure that most interactions could be tainted, no matter how long it
has been since a person served her sentence and no matter what else
the person has done. Indeed, criminal records are an example used by
privacy scholars to show how problematic the publication of partial
information about a person can be.287
Despite recognition from the scholarly community and from
advocates for the formerly incarcerated, reform in this area has been
glacial. As I have theorized here and elsewhere, this is due in large part
to the way in which politicians and voters are able to dismiss and
dehumanize the group of people—largely poor, nonwhite, and
politically uninfluential—who are affected by the forced publication of
their worst deeds.

(citation omitted)).
284. Id. at 311 (“In one . . . study, a single drug conviction caused employers to significantly
reduce their interest in prospective applicants who otherwise looked identical.”).
285. The racial disparities in the criminal justice system have been shown in the drug
enforcement context:
The dominating feature of the American criminal justice system is its deep racial
disparities. For example, although marijuana is used at similar rates across all age
groups in black and white communities, blacks are almost four times more likely to be
arrested for marijuana possession than whites across the United States and thus to
suffer the many collateral consequences of that arrest.
Roberts, supra note 247, at 331 (citation omitted); see also Pinard, supra note 264, at 972–73
(“Individuals of color constitute the majority of the incarcerated population in the United States.”
(citation omitted)).
286. Chin, supra note 20, at 1792 (arguing that records, combined with other collateral
consequences, cause “the degradation of a convict’s legal status to be a unitary punishment, the
new civil death”).
287. See Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1157 (2015) (including
criminal records on the list of “sensitive information” the article addresses); Solove, supra note
81; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 363 (2008)
(“[P]rivacy scholars have bemoaned . . . developments [increasing access to criminal records by
private individuals].” (citation omitted)); supra Part I.
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This is where the police come into play. As the last Section
describes, the impacts of criminal records are mirrored by the police’s
rhetoric about their own privacy.288 The problems with publicly
available criminal records are, for the most part, exemplary of the
concerns that police have over the publication of their PDRs.289 We
cannot at once lament the publicness of criminal records and, at the
same time, ignore the possibility that the same problems plague
individuals whose PDRs are published. Perhaps more significantly,
taking the police at their word provides important credence to the
plight of those with criminal records. The next Part discusses how to
marshal the police’s arguments in favor of the formerly incarcerated.
IV. USING POLICE ARGUMENTS TO PROTECT MORE VULNERABLE
CITIZENS
This Part suggests what it might look like if, instead of arguing in
favor of publicizing PDRs, advocates and scholars used the arguments
made by politically powerful police unions to show policy makers and
the public how instructive the arguments are for changing the criminal
record regime. It is not feasible that such arguments would change the
minds of law enforcement groups, whose raison d’être often relies on
an us-versus-them mentality. However, by combining the police’s selfserving arguments with the data and anecdotal evidence of the
formerly incarcerated, a powerful argument can be made, to those
willing to listen, that the principle and dynamics are similar for both
groups. More broadly, this section develops the theory that the police
share certain attributes with criminal offenders, including
scapegoating, scrutiny, and the use of the criminal justice system itself
to remedy perceived problems.290 Criminal justice reform is better
served by listening to the police when they tell us what they feel will
protect them from criminal or civil sanction.291 Although it is hard to
imagine that the police would choose to align their aims with the aims
of criminal defendants, we—as scholars, advocates, and
policymakers—should be able to hear what the police say about
themselves and use it to argue in favor of criminal justice reform, rather

288. See supra Part III.A.
289. See supra Part III.A.1.
290. See supra Part II.C (arguing that scapegoating officers allows police departments to
ignore systemic problems).
291. See Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, supra note 22, at 767–75; Levine, Police
Suspects, supra note 22, at 1234–58.
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than simply reflexively assuming the police’s agenda is always
antithetical to the aims of reformers.292
Issues that the police raise themselves—due process, reputational
harm, and institutional competence—infect both forms of record
transparency. Imagine if advocates pushing for PDR transparency in
states like California and New York, instead of using law-and-order
rhetoric to force police transparency, used the very arguments the
police make to protect themselves. They could show legislators and the
public the hypocrisy at work in a world where the police are protected
from the stain of publicizing their infractions but the formerly
incarcerated, who have already served a sentence of incarceration or
paid a criminal fine, have no choice but to live with such a stain.293
Such comparisons could support any number of favorable
arguments, from keeping minor criminal offenses private, to shielding
much more serious offenses after a certain amount of time. On the
minor-offense front, the police’s argument that small offenses—like
lateness, improper attire, or minor insubordination could, out of
context, be read to suggest that the officer was not fit to continue on
the job—could apply equally to someone with a record of minor
criminal offenses. Why should anyone be forced to suffer a permanent
taint from small mistakes that so many others have also made with
impunity? And even if something like a minor drug offense or
trespassing misdemeanor violation is taken to be far worse than minor
PDR infractions, a criminal offender is already punished far more
heavily than what a sanctioned officer faces with any allegation. This
difference in the magnitude of punishment is a powerful reason to take
criminal record privacy at least as seriously as PDR privacy—even
before one considers the uniquely permanent stain of a criminal record.
But the argument that punishment or discipline should not extend
beyond a criminal sentence or internal discipline applies with equal
force to far more serious crimes or disciplinary infractions. Take a
criminal assault or an unauthorized use of force by a police officer. We
punish the assaulter, often with a long prison sentence, and then we
brand her forever as an “assaulter.” If the police do not believe that
one improper use of force should forever brand a potentially good
officer as a brutal, bad-apple cop, then surely the same consideration
must be extended to a civilian who has committed assault. Indeed, it
should apply with even more force to private citizens, who are not
292. See Levine, Police Suspects, supra note 22, at 1205–12.
293. See supra Part III.B.
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trained in or tasked with upholding the law. And if the police want us
to believe that their internal disciplinary process works to punish and
deter such behavior without making it public, then surely the same can
be said of a sentence of incarceration served by a person convicted of
a crime. Moreover, so long as criminal records can be used as evidence
in future litigations, any subsequent sanctions will also be harsher than
they would otherwise be—regardless of whether those criminal records
are publicly visible.
More broadly, issues that the police do not acknowledge, such as
racial bias and scapegoating, threaten to diminish the legitimacy of
PDRs; more importantly, these issues cloud the systemic responses
necessary to reform policing and the criminal justice system.294
Criminal defense advocates should be wary of the way these biases and
narratives affect police officers, and the way police organizations
scapegoat those who refuse to toe the line. Connecting racism to
internal policing issues, and questioning discipline along such lines, has
a dual benefit. It will help reform advocates address systemic problems
that lead to the misconduct they seek to remedy. It will also continue
to highlight the way racism infects all aspects of the criminal justice
system.295
Aligning these arguments will not satisfy those on either side who
see fundamental differences between the police and the formerly
incarcerated, and fundamental differences between agents of the state
and private citizens.296 There is a legitimate argument that as agents of
the states, police give up a certain right to privacy; that that privacy is
outweighed by the public’s right to make informed decisions; and that,
in a democracy, not only those who are elected but also those who work
for elected officials must cede their privacy rights.297 There is also a
294. See supra Part II.C.
295. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 693 (1995) (describing the “radical critique” that “criminal law
is racist” (citation omitted)).
296. Cf. Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 617,
621 (2010) (“Under a strong form of transparency . . . all government information should be
available to the public; and in the rare instance when they must be kept from the
public, government secrets should not be so deep that their existence is unknown.” (citation
omitted)).
297. One argument that public agents’ privacy rights are constrained proceeds as follows:
Decent conceptions of democratic rule and individual liberty require, at a minimum,
that discretionary judgments and actions be open to the electorate. . . . Even harmful
abuses of discretion can be dealt with through legal and political recourse—as long as
the behavior is visible to the affected individual and the citizenry. Conversely, veiled
discretion cannot be evaluated by the public and is therefore incompatible with the
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valid argument that those who violate the criminal law also give up
their right to privacy; we can see both of these arguments at work in
our system.298 Indeed, it is these beliefs that underpin the many laws
already removing privacy both from government employees and from
those who are accused or convicted of criminal activity. Public record
laws, FOIA requests, and other laws allow for citizens and the media
to access the kinds of information about public officials that private
citizens would jealously guard.299 Similarly, the Fourth Amendment
protections from searches are drastically reduced, not only for those
convicted of crime, but also for those who are merely arrested.300
While these laws may make sense up to a point, forcing
transparency on police erodes the first principles upon which general
privacy laws are based.301 Moreover, law enforcement’s desire for
privacy is one tool that may help an otherwise skeptical legislator or
member of the public—who may be far more sympathetic to the police
than the formerly incarcerated—understand what risks such
transparency entails.302 It is similarly safe to say that attempting to force
transparency of PDRs is a step in the wrong direction for those who
wish to see our criminal justice system bend toward humanity rather
than continue along in its dehumanizing vein.303 This is a move that is
likely to further the racial and other stratifications that exist within
police departments themselves rather than addressing the policing
problems advocates wish to see fixed.

democratic prerequisite of popular accountability.
Luna, supra note 85, at 1108.
298. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006) (holding that a parolee’s right to privacy
is so “diminish[ed] [by virtue of his status] . . . that a suspicionless search by a law enforcement
officer [does] not offend the Fourth Amendment” (citation omitted)).
299. See, e.g., Pozen, supra note 23, at 16 (“FOIA contains some strikingly bold
features. . . . [I]t allows ‘any person’ to request any federal agency record for any reason, or no
reason at all.” (citation omitted)).
300. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66 (2013) (holding that taking a DNA swab
from an arrestee does not violate the Fourth Amendment because arrestees have a diminished
expectation of privacy); Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 322–
23 (2012) (holding that a search of an arrestee, including a genital search, is not too intrusive
because of the diminished expectation of privacy and because of the need to ensure officer safety);
Samson, 547 U.S. at 847; Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment
proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell.”).
301. See supra Part I.
302. See supra Parts III.A.1, III.B.
303. See Levine, Police Suspects, supra note 22, at 1234–58 (arguing that special interrogation
rights should apply to all, rather than be stripped from police, in order to reform criminal justice
system).
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This thought experiment does not mean that there is no place for
police discipline to be made public. And, as discussed in the final Part,
the police have too much protection in certain circumstances.304 But to
the extent that the debate over PDR transparency gives us a moment
to reflect on the problematic state of criminal records, thinking deeply
about transparency more generally may be of great benefit.
Overpoliced and overexposed communities may be better served by
harnessing law enforcement’s concerns about their own privacy than
by forcing criminal record transparency onto individual police officers.
V. BALANCING TRANSPARENCY AND PRIVACY FOR POLICE PDRS
This Part briefly explores what a proper balance for police PDRs
might look like. While this Article has argued that total transparency
for PDRs is not a useful policy, it is also clear that some of the
protections police have won through bargaining, statute, and court
decisions go too far. Put simply, evidence of police misconduct should
be available to prosecutors, defense attorneys, and civil litigants in
police brutality cases.305 Furthermore, PDRs should be available to all
law enforcement agencies through a federal database. This would
address the all too regular practice of officers who are terminated from
one police agency gaining employment with another agency that is
unaware of the reasons for his or her prior termination.306 Returning,
briefly, to the privacy discussion laid out in Part I, this Part suggests
that this type of mid-level transparency is akin to “practical obscurity,”
a useful concept that already exists in practice and theory.
Whatever harms, systemic or personal, come from outing an
individual officer’s misconduct records, they are both minimized and
outweighed in a courtroom setting.307 They are minimized because
lawyers and judges are, or rather should be, competent to assess such
records. Lawyers and judges deal constantly with records of

304. This is a point I have made in two past articles regarding the waiting periods police get
before they are interrogated during an internal or criminal investigation. See id. at 1236; Kate
Levine & Stephen Rushin, Interrogation Parity, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1685, 1688–91.
305. See Conti-Cook, supra note 8, at 1082–83 (noting that keeping misconduct secret from
criminal defendants is antithetical to the rights of the accused to confront witnesses and to a fair
trial); Levine, We Need to Talk, supra note 26, at 4–6 (observing that the balance of interests
favors allowing defendants to see PDRs).
306. Cf. Conti-Cook, supra note 8, at 1074 (suggesting that the same access should be granted
to defendants in criminal cases should be granted to civil litigants).
307. The same argument can be made for criminal records. Because the focus of this Article
is PDRs, and for brevity’s sake, I focus only on solutions to PDR transparency here.
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misconduct; have access to witnesses who can give context to a record
of misconduct; and, in our adversarial system, have ways to test out the
veracity and legitimacy of individual charges of misconduct. Thus, fear
that a PDR could violate an officer’s due process, harm her reputation,
or be overstated are not as palpable as they would be if PDRs were
publicly released.
The harms that PDR publication could cause an individual officer
are also outweighed by the needs of criminal defendants and civil
litigants. This is most clear in a criminal trial, where a defendant must
have the tools to defend herself. In many criminal trials, impeaching
the credibility of a police officer is the most important tool he or she
could have.308 In the thousands of cases where the only witness to a
crime is a police officer, her testimony may be the difference between
a charge and a dismissal, a conviction and an acquittal. The prosecutor
must know whether an officer has a misconduct allegation, both to
discharge her Brady duty,309 and, more importantly, to exercise her
duty to see that justice is done.310 In California, police privacy has
swung to a ludicrous point where prosecutors do not have access to
information about officers who are known to have perjured
themselves.311 While this is extreme, it should simply be the policy that
all official misconduct is shared with the prosecutor’s office. The
prosecutor should then be required to turn over misconduct to a
defendant’s attorney. It is possible that certain allegations or certain
types of allegations could or should be excluded, but that issue is
beyond the scope of this Article. It is untenable—particularly in light
of the credibility police are given by judges and juries,312 combined with
308. Cf. PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 102 (2009) (“One
of your primary functions as a prosecutor is to make the judge and jury believe the police.”).
309. See Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot, supra note 12, passim (arguing that secret PDRs prevent
prosecutors from discharging their duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense).
310. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 65–66 (2011) (“Prosecutors have a special
duty to seek justice, not merely to convict.” (quotations omitted)); accord ABA CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 3–1.2(b) (4th ed. 2015).
311. See Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 56–59 (2017)
(holding that the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department was not required to turn over its “Brady list,”
which contained names of officers whose “personnel files contain sustained allegations of
misconduct allegedly involving moral turpitude or other bad acts relevant to impeachment”).
312. William Bermeister, former head of New York’s anti-corruption prosecution unit, noted
that police prosecutions have a double credibility problem where “jurors give officers the benefit
of a doubt,” while at the same time “if you don’t have an ‘innocent’ victim, jurors don’t
care.” See Asit S. Panwala, The Failure of Local and Federal Prosecutors to Curb Police Brutality,
30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639, 644 (2003) (quoting Interview with William Burmeister, Chief, N.Y.
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reams of evidence that many officers are not truthful313—for
defendants to not have the right to confront police with evidence of
their past misconduct if it is relevant to the case at hand.
Similarly, civil litigants suing the police for brutality or other
infractions should have access to misconduct records.314 The balance
here might have to be weighed on a more case-by-case basis, as the
potential for litigation abuses and mishandling of records is a larger
concern.315 But given the difficulty inherent in litigating as a civilian
against the police,316 and the important reforms that can arise from such
litigation,317 the benefits outweigh the harms, once again. Specifically,

Cty.’s Dist. Attorney’s Official-Corruption Unit, in N.Y.C, N.Y. (May 3, 1999)); see also Anthony
G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 785, 792 (1970) (noting that fact finders generally find police testimony credible).
313. Slobogin, supra note 176, at 1040 (“[Police] lying intended to convict the guilty – in
particular, lying to evade the consequences of the exclusionary rule – is so common and so
accepted in some jurisdictions that the police themselves have come up with a name for it:
‘testilying.’” (citations omitted)).
314. Conti-Cook, supra note 8, at 1074.
315. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 998 (2003) (“In 1990, concerned about civil litigation abuse – particularly
during discovery – increasing costs and delay, and overexpansive access to the federal
courts, Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA).” (citations omitted)). But see
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of “Abusive”
ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) (noting that concern over abuse of civil rights
litigation is overstated and frustrates the purpose of civil rights statutes: “For many federal judges,
however, widespread violations of [the ADA] appear to be of less significance than the motives
of the relatively few individuals who are seeking to enforce that law”).
316. See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1399 (2000) (“Damage suits
against police departments and individual officers, however, have proven largely ineffectual in
remedying the problem of police brutality and misconduct.” (citation omitted)); Alison L.
Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is Ineffective in Deterring Police
Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 755 (1993) (“When bringing a suit under section 1983, a victim
of excessive force faces the difficult tasks of first, finding an attorney, and then, winning the case.
To be successful, the victim and the attorney must overcome financial, procedural, and
evidentiary obstacles.”).
317. One author notes that although civil litigation has faced numerous obstacles, it should,
in theory, lead to reform:
[C]ivil litigation is a cost-raising regulation tactic. It only works if aggrieved parties
regularly litigate and departments feel the financial consequences of this litigation, thus
motivating them to change behaviors and policies. At least one study has shown that
civil litigation has raised the potential cost of misconduct high enough to force a
response by local police agencies.
Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3201–02
(2014) (citation omitted). See also Rachel Harmon, Limited Leverage: Federal Remedies and
Policing Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 33, 34 (2012) (“Federal remedies both increase
the expected costs of engaging in misconduct for police officers, and perhaps more importantly,
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a major reason the benefits outweigh the harms in civil litigation is that
information can be managed. Judges can seal records, impose gag
orders, close the courtroom, and make other rulings that protect
information against broad dissemination.318
Another context in which PDRs should be more transparent is the
network of law enforcement agencies. We can see the problem in the
employment of Timothy Loehmann, the officer who shot and killed
twelve-year-old Tamir Rice. Loehmann was finally terminated, not
because he used excessive force on a child, but because it was
determined that he had failed to disclose his termination from another
police department in the same state when he applied for employment
with the Cleveland Police Department.319 His supervisors in the small
police department of Independence, Ohio, had recommended his
termination, “citing instances of insubordination, lying and an inability
to emotionally function.” Loehmann instead resigned from the
Independence Police Department, and he did not disclose these
infractions on his application to work in Cleveland. The Cleveland
Police Department should have had immediate access to any
misconduct committed by that officer, but it did not.320 As Roger L.
Goldman and Steven Puro have noted, unlike most licensed
professions, law enforcement is often under local, not state, control.321
This means that an officer with a record of misconduct bad enough to
get fired from one department can be rehired by another. Moreover,
this encourages officers with problematic records to voluntarily quit
local departments, without fear that their records will follow them.
increase the expected costs of permitting misconduct for police departments.”).
318. Cf. Oliner v. Kontrabecki, 745 F.3d 1024, 1026 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The party seeking
to seal any part of a judicial record bears the heavy burden of showing [in addition to another
element] . . . that disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party . . . . A party
who seeks to seal an entire record faces an even heavier burden.” (quoting Miller v. Ind. Hosp.,
16 F.3d 549, 551 (3d Cir. 1994))). A court may decide that a PDR should not be kept secret in an
individual case. In such a situation, the judge will have weighed the merits of the loss of privacy
against the public’s right to see the record.
319. Jacey Fortin & Jonah Engel Bromwich, Cleveland Police Officer Who Shot Tamir Rice
is Fired, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/30/us/cleveland-policetamir-rice.html [https://perma.cc/354J-F52H].
320. Id. One news article notes that the Cleveland Police Department should have done a
“background check,” which is certainly correct. However, the Cleveland Police Department
should also have had the relevant information at its fingertips, in a central database. Id.
321. Roger L. Goldman & Steven Puro, Revocation of Police Officer Certification: A Viable
Remedy for Police Misconduct?, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 541, 545–46 (2001) (“Although virtually
every other profession is regulated by a state board with the power to remove or suspend the
licenses or certificates of unfit members of the profession (e.g., attorneys, physicians, teachers),
there has been a longstanding tradition of local control of police without state involvement.”).
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Other departments, even in the same state, may not know about the
officers’ records, or may know and hire them anyway because of a
dearth of option.
Goldman and Puro suggest that every state have an agency, known
as a Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission (“POST”).
Only seven states currently have such a commission in place. A POST
has the authority to hold hearings and impose sanctions on any officer
in the state. A POST can impose “revocation, decertification or
cancellation, [of the officer’s license].” This ensures “that officers
cannot continue to practice their profession in the state . . . . It treats
the police profession like any other – if minimum standards of
performance are not met, the person loses the privilege of continuing
in the profession.”322 Beyond the ability to hold officers to a statewide,
rather than local, standard, having a central authority would ensure
that record keeping is standardized. This would allow for the collection
and study of anonymized records, which could provide scholars and
policing experts with important data. This data could reveal trends in
particular police departments of problematic policing and problematic
police discipline—based on race, gender, sexuality, or some other
aspect of an officer’s biography not related to his or her performance.323
Such anonymized information could reap many of the benefits that
advocates of PDR transparency hope to achieve, without the concerns
this Article has raised regarding the arbitrariness of discipline.
This kind of intermediate step between privacy and transparency
may seem difficult to make work in practice. In particular, one may
question whether allowing access to PDRs in courtroom and
administrative settings may inevitably lead to public knowledge
through leaks or media attention. Yet, this kind of privacytransparency hybrid already exists in Supreme Court decisions and
privacy scholarship in the concept of “practical obscurity.”324 This
concept applies to information that is technically available to the public
but considered “practically obscure” because of the burden associated
with discovering it. Courts and commentators have noted that there is

322. Id. at 543–44 (citations omitted).
323. See supra Part II.C.
324. Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 21 (2013) (discussing information that was technically available to the public, but could
only be found by spending a burdensome and unrealistic amount of time and effort in obtaining
it). The information was considered practically obscure because of the extremely high cost and
low likelihood of the information being compiled by the public. Id.
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a difference between court records and “a computerized summary
located in a single clearinghouse of information.”325
In other words, the intermediate step of allowing some litigants
and police administrative organizations access to PDRs but keeping
these records from being seamlessly accessible online strikes an
appropriate balance between necessary disclosure and full
transparency. This approach also preserves the ability of, and
potentially provides a workable roadmap for, criminal justice reform
advocates to hold the treatment of police in the criminal justice system
up both as a mirror—reflecting the way the system treats ordinary
criminal defendants too harshly—and as an aspirational model for how
all citizens deserve to be treated.
CONCLUSION
Along with growing awareness of the problematic state of policing
in this country, there comes a wellspring of immediate and appealing
solutions. These solutions often take the form of foisting the harshest
policies used against ordinary citizens—such as criminal punishment
and permanent reputational stain—onto individual police officers. The
central argument of this Article, and of my work more generally, is that
attempting to punish the police the way we do citizens accused of bad
or criminal acts is problematic in two important ways. First, it does not
solve, and may in fact exacerbate, the systemic and organizational
problems that have led to the current state of overpolicing and
underaccountability from police departments. Second, such solutions
legitimize the policies and punishments that have led to our current
state of mass incarceration and a permanent underclass of mostly poor
people of color forever tainted by criminal convictions. We will not be
able to reform our criminal justice system without reforming our
reliance on and accession to police organizations. At the same time,
attempting to reform policing by using the same harsh rhetoric and
methods used against the millions of citizens who come in contact with
our criminal justice system is ineffective and threatens to further
entrench harmful criminal justice policy.

325. Id.

